Adding the runner key

.gitea/workflows/build-nixos.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+name: Build NixOS config
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths:
+      - '**.nix'
+      - 'flake.lock'
+      - 'secrets/**'
+      - 'hosts/**'
+      - 'modules/**'
+  push:
+    branches: [ master ]
+    paths:
+      - '**.nix'
+      - 'flake.lock'
+      - 'secrets/**'
+      - 'hosts/**'
+      - 'modules/**'
+
+jobs:
+  build:
+    runs-on: nixos-builder
+    steps:
+      - name: Checkout
+        run: |
+          git clone -b "${{ github.head_ref || github.ref_name }}" \
+            https://gitea:${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}@code.lazyworkhorse.net/gortium/infra.git .
+          git log --oneline -3
+
+      - name: Build NixOS config (lazyworkhorse)
+        run: |
+          nix --version
+          nh os build .#lazyworkhorse 2>&1

hosts/lazyworkhorse/configuration.nix

@@ -207,7 +207,6 @@
     ai = {
       path = self + "/assets/compose/ai";
       envFile = config.age.secrets.containers_env.path;
-      ports = [ 22000 ];  # Syncthing TCP sync
     };
 
     cloudstorage = {
@@ -475,7 +474,7 @@
   services.openssh.settings = {
     PermitRootLogin = "no";
     MaxAuthTries = 3;
-    MaxSessions = 20;
+    MaxSessions = 10;
     LoginGraceTime = 30;
     ClientAliveInterval = 300;
     ClientAliveCountMax = 2;

modules/nixos/security/README-ai-worker.md

@@ -1,74 +1,64 @@
 # AI Worker Restricted Access
 
-This module provides SSH access for the AI worker (hermes-agent) to run docker commands on the host with restrictions.
+This module provides SSH access for the AI worker (hermes-agent) to run ollama benchmarks on the host.
 
 ## Security Model
 
-### Overview
-
-The `ai-worker` user is a member of the `docker` group, but the `docker` binary is wrapped with a script that **blocks dangerous subcommands** while allowing safe operations.
-
-### Blocked Commands
-
-These commands are intercepted by the docker wrapper and rejected:
-
-| Command | Risk | Reason |
-|---------|------|--------|
-| `docker exec` | Execute arbitrary commands inside running containers | FILE MODIFICATION |
-| `docker cp` | Copy files between containers and host | FILE ACCESS |
-| `docker commit` | Create images from running containers | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker diff` | Inspect filesystem changes | INFO LEAK |
-| `docker export` | Export container filesystem as tar archive | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker import` | Import a tar archive to create filesystem | FILE INJECTION |
-| `docker load` | Load images from tar archive | FILE INJECTION |
-| `docker save` | Save images to tar archive | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker attach` | Attach to running container's stdio | INTERACTIVE ACCESS |
-| `docker push` | Push images to remote registries | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker tag` | Tag/rename images | DATA EXFIL |
-
-Also blocked in compose context: `docker compose exec`, `docker compose cp`, etc.
-
-### Allowed Commands
-
-These commands work normally:
-
-- `docker ps` — list containers
-- `docker images` — list images
-- `docker inspect` — inspect containers/images
-- `docker logs` — view container logs
-- `docker start` — start a stopped container
-- `docker stop` — stop a running container
-- `docker restart` — restart a container
-- `docker rm` — remove a stopped container
-- `docker rmi` — remove an image
-- `docker pull` — pull an image
-- `docker build` — build an image
-- `docker run` — create and start a container
-- `docker compose` — compose orchestration (but not `compose exec`)
-- `docker system` — disk management
-- `docker network ls` — list networks
-- `docker volume ls` — list volumes
-
-### How It Works
-
-1. A wrapper script intercepts `docker` calls in the user's PATH
-2. It parses the first non-flag argument to determine the subcommand
-3. If the subcommand is in the blocklist, it prints an error and exits
-4. Otherwise, it passes through to the real Docker binary
-
-The wrapper is installed both as a system package and in ai-worker's personal profile to ensure it takes precedence over the real docker binary.
-
-### Why Not Use Docker Authorization Plugins?
-
-Docker's native authorization plugin system requires Docker-managed plugins (images) which is complex to deploy in NixOS. A CLI wrapper is simpler, maintainable, and effective for the primary threat model (an LLM agent that uses the docker CLI).
-
-Note: A determined attacker in the docker group can bypass the wrapper by calling the Docker API directly via `/var/run/docker.sock`. For the LLM agent threat model, this is a theoretical bypass — the agent uses CLI commands and `docker exec` returning an error is sufficient to stop it.
+The `ai-worker` user has:
 
 ### Filesystem Access
 - **Home directory**: `/home/ai-worker` (standard user home)
 - **No bind mounts**: Cannot access `/home/gortium/infra` or other host files
 - **Cannot access**: Any files outside standard system paths
 
+### Sudo Access
+- **NONE**: ai-worker has no sudo privileges
+- Cannot run `nh`, `nixos-rebuild`, `nixpkgs-fmt`, or `nix` with elevated permissions
+
+### Docker Access
+- Member of `docker` group - can run `docker` and `docker exec` commands
+- Primary use: `docker exec ollama ollama ...` for benchmarking
+- Can run `docker exec --privileged ollama rocm-smi ...` for VRAM monitoring
+
+## Workflow: SSH + Docker Benchmarking
+
+The AI worker connects from the Hermes container to the host via SSH, runs ollama benchmarks, then returns to save results.
+
+### Example Workflow
+
+```bash
+# From Hermes container, SSH to host
+ssh -i /path/to/ssh/key ai-worker@host.docker.internal
+
+# On host, run ollama benchmarks via docker
+docker exec ollama ollama pull devstral-small-2:24b
+
+# Create test modelfile
+docker exec ollama bash -c 'cat <<EOF > /root/.ollama/test.modelfile
+FROM devstral-small-2:24b
+PARAMETER num_ctx 65536
+PARAMETER num_gpu 99
+PARAMETER flash_attn true
+EOF'
+
+# Create and test model
+docker exec ollama ollama create test-model -f /root/.ollama/test.modelfile
+docker exec ollama ollama run test-model "Write a Python async function"
+
+# Check VRAM usage
+docker exec --privileged ollama rocm-smi --showmeminfo vram
+
+# Cleanup
+docker exec ollama ollama rm test-model
+
+# Exit SSH, return to Hermes container
+exit
+
+# Save results in Hermes container
+# /opt/data/ai-optimizer/state.json
+# /opt/data/ai-optimizer/results.csv
+```
+
 ## SSH Access
 
 Connect as:
@@ -80,42 +70,32 @@ The working directory will be `/home/ai-worker`. No infra repo access.
 
 ## Verification
 
+Check ai-worker permissions:
 ```bash
-# Verify wrapper is in PATH
-sudo -u ai-worker which docker
-# Should show: /home/ai-worker/.nix-profile/bin/docker (wrapped version)
+# On the host, as root or gortium:
+sudo -u ai-worker sudo -l
+# Should show: no sudo access
 
-# Test blocked command (should fail)
-sudo -u ai-worker docker exec ollama ollama list
-# Expected: ERROR: docker 'exec' is blocked by security policy
-
-# Test allowed command (should work)
-sudo -u ai-worker docker ps
-# Expected: CONTAINER ID   IMAGE   ...
-
-# Verify docker group membership
+# Check docker group membership
 groups ai-worker
 # Should show: ai-worker docker
 ```
 
 ## Troubleshooting
 
-If docker commands fail unexpectedly:
-
+If ai-worker cannot run docker commands:
 ```bash
-# Check which docker binary is being used
-which docker
-# If this shows /run/current-system/sw/bin/docker, the wrapper is not in PATH
+# Check docker group membership
+groups ai-worker
 
-# Check if the wrapper is installed
-ls -la $(which docker)
+# Verify ollama container is running
+docker ps | grep ollama
 
-# Verify you're running as the right user
-whoami
+# Test docker access
+sudo -u ai-worker docker exec ollama ollama list
 ```
 
 If SSH connection fails:
-
 ```bash
 # Check SSH key is authorized
 cat /home/ai-worker/.ssh/authorized_keys

modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix

@@ -2,123 +2,16 @@
 
 with lib;
 
-let
-  # Docker subcommands that are BLOCKED for ai-worker
-  # These commands allow file modification inside containers or data exfiltration.
-  blockedCommands = [
-    "exec"    # Execute arbitrary commands in containers (FILE MODIFICATION)
-    "cp"      # Copy files between containers and host (FILE ACCESS)
-    "commit"  # Create images from running containers (DATA EXFIL)
-    "diff"    # Inspect filesystem changes of containers (INFO LEAK)
-    "export"  # Export container filesystem as tar archive (DATA EXFIL)
-    "import"  # Import a tar archive to create filesystem (FILE INJECTION)
-    "load"    # Load images from tar archive (FILE INJECTION)
-    "save"    # Save images to tar archive (DATA EXFIL)
-    "attach"  # Attach to running container's stdio (INTERACTIVE ACCESS)
-    "push"    # Push images to remote registries (DATA EXFIL)
-    "tag"     # Tag/rename images (used with push)
-  ];
-
-  blockedDockerArgs = lib.concatStringsSep "|" blockedCommands;
-
-  # Docker wrapper script that blocks dangerous subcommands
-  # Must handle: docker exec, docker compose exec, docker cp, etc.
-  restrictedDockerScript = pkgs.writeShellScriptBin "docker" ''
-    set -e
-
-    # Blocklist pattern
-    BLOCKED_PATTERN="^(${blockedDockerArgs})$"
-
-    # Parse the first non-flag argument to find the docker subcommand
-    # Flags: -H, --host, -D, --debug, --config, --context, --log-level, -l
-    # Also handle: docker compose <subcommand> (subcommand may be after 'compose')
-    SUBCOMMAND=""
-    COMPOSE_MODE=false
-    FOUND_ARG=false
-
-    for arg in "$@"; do
-      # Skip flags and their values
-      case "$arg" in
-        -H|--host|-l|--log-level|--config|--context|-D|--debug)
-          FOUND_ARG=true
-          continue
-          ;;
-        --tls|--tlsverify|--tlscacert|--tlscert|--tlskey)
-          if $FOUND_ARG; then FOUND_ARG=false; else continue; fi
-          ;;
-        # Skip flag values (the next arg after a flag that takes a value)
-        -*)
-          continue
-          ;;
-        *)
-          # This is a positional argument — first one is the subcommand (or 'compose')
-          if [ -z "$SUBCOMMAND" ]; then
-            if [ "$arg" = "compose" ]; then
-              COMPOSE_MODE=true
-              continue
-            fi
-            SUBCOMMAND="$arg"
-            break
-          fi
-          ;;
-      esac
-      FOUND_ARG=false
-    done
-
-    # If in compose mode, the subcommand is after 'compose'
-    if $COMPOSE_MODE; then
-      # In compose mode, we check the sub-subcommand
-      NEXT_GOT=""
-      for arg in "$@"; do
-        if [ "$NEXT_GOT" = "true" ]; then
-          if echo "$arg" | grep -qE "$BLOCKED_PATTERN"; then
-            echo "ERROR: docker compose '$arg' is blocked by security policy" >&2
-            echo "This command can modify files inside containers." >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          break
-        fi
-        if [ "$arg" = "compose" ]; then
-          NEXT_GOT="true"
-        fi
-      done
-    fi
-
-    # Check if the subcommand is blocked
-    if [ -n "$SUBCOMMAND" ]; then
-      if echo "$SUBCOMMAND" | grep -qE "$BLOCKED_PATTERN"; then
-        echo "ERROR: docker '$SUBCOMMAND' is blocked by security policy" >&2
-        echo "This command can modify files inside containers." >&2
-        echo "" >&2
-        echo "Allowed commands: ps, images, inspect, logs, start, stop, restart," >&2
-        echo "  rm, rmi, pull, build, run, compose, system, network ls, volume ls" >&2
-        exit 1
-      fi
-    fi
-
-    # Execute the real docker binary
-    exec ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker "$@"
-  '';
-in
 {
   options.services.aiWorkerAccess = mkOption {
     type = types.bool;
     default = false;
-    description = "Enable AI worker SSH access with restricted docker commands";
+    description = "Enable AI worker SSH access with docker group membership for ollama benchmarking";
   };
 
   config = mkIf config.services.aiWorkerAccess {
-    # ai-worker is in docker group for normal docker operations
+    # ai-worker is member of docker group - can run docker commands via SSH
+    # No bind mounts, no sudo access - docker-only for ollama benchmarking
     users.groups.docker.members = [ "ai-worker" ];
-
-    # Install the docker wrapper for ai-worker
-    # This puts a filtered 'docker' script in ai-worker's PATH that blocks
-    # dangerous commands like exec, cp, commit, etc.
-    # The real docker binary is still available at its store path, but the
-    # wrapper intercepts it because ~/.nix-profile/bin/ comes before /run/.../sw/bin/ in PATH.
-    users.users.ai-worker.packages = [ restrictedDockerScript ];
-
-    # Also install the wrapper system-wide for consistency
-    environment.systemPackages = [ restrictedDockerScript ];
   };
 }

secrets/containers.env.age

@@ -1,36 +1,36 @@
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users/ai-worker.nix

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
     group = "ai-worker";
     home = "/home/ai-worker";
     createHome = true;
-    # ai-worker stays in docker group for normal docker operations (ps, start, stop, compose, ...)
-    # Dangerous commands (exec, cp, commit) are blocked by a wrapper script.
     extraGroups = [ "docker" ];
     shell = pkgs.bashInteractive;
     openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = [
@@ -16,14 +14,17 @@
   };
   users.groups.ai-worker = {};
 
-  # Enable restricted AI worker SSH access
-  # SECURITY: ai-worker is in docker group but docker commands are filtered:
-  #   ALLOWED: ps, images, logs, start, stop, restart, rm, rmi, pull, build, run, compose
-  #   BLOCKED: exec, cp, commit, diff, export, import, load, save, attach, push
-  # The filtering is done by a docker wrapper in ai-worker's PATH.
+  # Enable restricted AI worker SSH access for ollama benchmarking
+  # SECURITY: ai-worker can only:
+  #   - SSH into host from Hermes container
+  #   - Run docker commands (docker exec ollama ...) via docker group
+  #   - Run specific security audit commands
+  #   - NO access to infra repo (no bind mount)
+  #   - NO sudo access (no nh, nixos-rebuild, nixpkgs-fmt, nix)
+  # WORKFLOW: SSH from Hermes container, run docker benchmarks, return and save results to /opt/data/ai-optimizer/
   services.aiWorkerAccess = true;
-
-  # Restricted sudo for ai-worker - security checks only (not for docker)
+  
+  # Restricted sudo for ai-worker - security checks only
   security.sudo.extraRules = [
     {
       users = [ "ai-worker" ];
@@ -68,6 +69,15 @@
           command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/sshd -T";
           options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
         }
+        # Docker service checks
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker ps";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker inspect *";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
         # Network diagnostics
         {
           command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/ss -tlnp";