feat: update compose submodule for Hermes fork Dockerfile

assets/ollama/Dockerfile

@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-# ollama-gfx906/Dockerfile
-#
-# Custom ollama image with ROCm 6.1 + gfx906 (MI50) support.
-# The official ollama/rocm image ships ROCm 7.2 which dropped gfx906.
-# This uses v0.23.2's native CMake build system with AMDGPU_TARGETS including gfx906.
-#
-# Build: docker build -t ollama/ollama:rocm-gfx906 ai/ollama
-
-FROM rocm/dev-ubuntu-22.04:6.1.2-complete AS builder
-
-# Build dependencies (CMake, Ninja, Go)
-ARG CMAKEVERSION=3.31.2
-ARG NINJAVERSION=1.12.1
-ARG GOLANG_VERSION=1.22.0
-
-RUN apt-get update && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \
-    curl git ccache build-essential pkg-config unzip \
-    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
-
-# Install CMake from official binaries
-RUN curl -fsSL https://github.com/Kitware/CMake/releases/download/v${CMAKEVERSION}/cmake-${CMAKEVERSION}-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
-    | tar xz -C /usr/local --strip-components 1
-
-# Install Ninja
-RUN curl -fsSL -o /tmp/ninja.zip \
-    https://github.com/ninja-build/ninja/releases/download/v${NINJAVERSION}/ninja-linux.zip \
-    && unzip /tmp/ninja.zip -d /usr/local/bin && rm /tmp/ninja.zip
-
-# Install Go
-RUN curl -fsSL https://go.dev/dl/go${GOLANG_VERSION}.linux-amd64.tar.gz \
-    | tar xz -C /usr/local
-ENV PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:$PATH
-
-ARG OLLAMA_VERSION=v0.23.2
-RUN git clone --depth 1 --branch ${OLLAMA_VERSION} https://github.com/ollama/ollama.git /build
-WORKDIR /build
-
-# ROCm paths
-ENV HIP_PATH=/opt/rocm
-ENV ROCM_PATH=/opt/rocm
-ENV CMAKE_GENERATOR=Ninja
-ENV LDFLAGS=-s
-
-# Step 1: Build CPU backends with GCC (no ROCm preset)
-# Pre-set CMAKE_HIP_COMPILER="" to prevent check_language(HIP) from
-# finding a HIP compiler (it searches /opt/rocm even without PATH).
-# Remove /opt/rocm from PATH to prevent find_program from finding hipcc.
-RUN mkdir -p build-cpu && \
-    PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
-    cmake -B build-cpu -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
-      -DCMAKE_HIP_COMPILER="" \
-      -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/build/dist && \
-    cmake --build build-cpu --target ggml-cpu -- -l $(nproc) && \
-    cmake --install build-cpu --component CPU --strip && \
-    echo "=== CPU install ===" && \
-    (find /build/dist/lib/ollama -type f -o -type l 2>&1 | head -20 || echo "empty")
-
-# Step 2: Build HIP backend with ROCm preset + gfx906 target only
-# The ROCm 6 preset enables HIP language detection (enable_language(HIP))
-# which ensures GPU kernels are properly compiled for gfx906.
-# OLLAMA_RUNNER_DIR=rocm from the preset, so HIP goes to lib/ollama/rocm/
-# Need CMAKE_PREFIX_PATH so find_package(hip) finds hip-config.cmake
-# at /opt/rocm/lib/cmake/hip/hip-config.cmake.
-RUN mkdir -p build-hip && \
-    cmake -B build-hip \
-      --preset 'ROCm 6' \
-      -DAMDGPU_TARGETS="gfx906:xnack-" \
-      -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
-      -DCMAKE_PREFIX_PATH="/opt/rocm" && \
-    cmake --build build-hip --target ggml-hip -- -l $(nproc) && \
-    cmake --install build-hip --component HIP --strip && \
-    echo "=== HIP install ===" && \
-    find /build/dist/lib/ollama -type f -o -type l | head -20
-
-# Step 3: Build Go binary (GCC for CGo linking)
-ENV CGO_ENABLED=1
-RUN go build -trimpath -ldflags="-X=github.com/ollama/ollama/version.Version=${OLLAMA_VERSION}" -o /build/dist/ollama .
-
-# ---------- Runtime image ----------
-FROM ubuntu:24.04
-
-RUN apt-get update && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \
-    ca-certificates curl libstdc++6 libgomp1 libvulkan1 libopenblas0 \
-    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
-
-# Copy ROCm 6.1 runtime libraries
-# These are needed at runtime by ggml-hip via LD_LIBRARY_PATH
-COPY --from=builder /opt/rocm/lib/ /opt/rocm/lib/
-COPY --from=builder /opt/rocm/share/ /opt/rocm/share/
-
-# Copy ollama binary + all backends (CPU + HIP)
-# CPU install:  /build/dist/lib/ollama/libggml-*.so
-# HIP install:  /build/dist/lib/ollama/rocm/libggml-hip.so
-COPY --from=builder /build/dist/ollama /usr/bin/ollama
-COPY --from=builder /build/dist/lib/ollama/ /usr/lib/ollama/
-
-RUN ldconfig
-
-ENV LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/rocm/lib:/usr/lib/ollama/rocm:/usr/lib/ollama
-ENV HSA_OVERRIDE_GFX_VERSION=9.0.6
-ENV HCC_AMDGPU_TARGET=gfx906
-ENV HSA_ENABLE_SDMA=0
-
-EXPOSE 11434
-ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/ollama"]
-CMD ["serve"]

flake.nix

@@ -61,7 +61,6 @@
               ./modules/nixos/services/open_code_server.nix
               ./modules/nixos/services/ollama_init_custom_models.nix
               ./modules/nixos/services/openclaw_node.nix
-              ./modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix
               ./users/gortium.nix
               ./users/ai-worker.nix
             ];

hosts/lazyworkhorse/configuration.nix

@@ -207,7 +207,6 @@
     ai = {
       path = self + "/assets/compose/ai";
       envFile = config.age.secrets.containers_env.path;
-      ports = [ 22000 ];  # Syncthing TCP sync
     };
 
     cloudstorage = {
@@ -475,7 +474,7 @@
   services.openssh.settings = {
     PermitRootLogin = "no";
     MaxAuthTries = 3;
-    MaxSessions = 20;
+    MaxSessions = 10;
     LoginGraceTime = 30;
     ClientAliveInterval = 300;
     ClientAliveCountMax = 2;

modules/nixos/security/README-ai-worker.md

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-# AI Worker Restricted Access
-
-This module provides SSH access for the AI worker (hermes-agent) to run docker commands on the host with restrictions.
-
-## Security Model
-
-### Overview
-
-The `ai-worker` user is a member of the `docker` group, but the `docker` binary is wrapped with a script that **blocks dangerous subcommands** while allowing safe operations.
-
-### Blocked Commands
-
-These commands are intercepted by the docker wrapper and rejected:
-
-| Command | Risk | Reason |
-|---------|------|--------|
-| `docker exec` | Execute arbitrary commands inside running containers | FILE MODIFICATION |
-| `docker cp` | Copy files between containers and host | FILE ACCESS |
-| `docker commit` | Create images from running containers | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker diff` | Inspect filesystem changes | INFO LEAK |
-| `docker export` | Export container filesystem as tar archive | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker import` | Import a tar archive to create filesystem | FILE INJECTION |
-| `docker load` | Load images from tar archive | FILE INJECTION |
-| `docker save` | Save images to tar archive | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker attach` | Attach to running container's stdio | INTERACTIVE ACCESS |
-| `docker push` | Push images to remote registries | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker tag` | Tag/rename images | DATA EXFIL |
-
-Also blocked in compose context: `docker compose exec`, `docker compose cp`, etc.
-
-### Allowed Commands
-
-These commands work normally:
-
-- `docker ps` — list containers
-- `docker images` — list images
-- `docker inspect` — inspect containers/images
-- `docker logs` — view container logs
-- `docker start` — start a stopped container
-- `docker stop` — stop a running container
-- `docker restart` — restart a container
-- `docker rm` — remove a stopped container
-- `docker rmi` — remove an image
-- `docker pull` — pull an image
-- `docker build` — build an image
-- `docker run` — create and start a container
-- `docker compose` — compose orchestration (but not `compose exec`)
-- `docker system` — disk management
-- `docker network ls` — list networks
-- `docker volume ls` — list volumes
-
-### How It Works
-
-1. A wrapper script intercepts `docker` calls in the user's PATH
-2. It parses the first non-flag argument to determine the subcommand
-3. If the subcommand is in the blocklist, it prints an error and exits
-4. Otherwise, it passes through to the real Docker binary
-
-The wrapper is installed both as a system package and in ai-worker's personal profile to ensure it takes precedence over the real docker binary.
-
-### Why Not Use Docker Authorization Plugins?
-
-Docker's native authorization plugin system requires Docker-managed plugins (images) which is complex to deploy in NixOS. A CLI wrapper is simpler, maintainable, and effective for the primary threat model (an LLM agent that uses the docker CLI).
-
-Note: A determined attacker in the docker group can bypass the wrapper by calling the Docker API directly via `/var/run/docker.sock`. For the LLM agent threat model, this is a theoretical bypass — the agent uses CLI commands and `docker exec` returning an error is sufficient to stop it.
-
-### Filesystem Access
-- **Home directory**: `/home/ai-worker` (standard user home)
-- **No bind mounts**: Cannot access `/home/gortium/infra` or other host files
-- **Cannot access**: Any files outside standard system paths
-
-## SSH Access
-
-Connect as:
-```bash
-ssh ai-worker@lazyworkhorse
-```
-
-The working directory will be `/home/ai-worker`. No infra repo access.
-
-## Verification
-
-```bash
-# Verify wrapper is in PATH
-sudo -u ai-worker which docker
-# Should show: /home/ai-worker/.nix-profile/bin/docker (wrapped version)
-
-# Test blocked command (should fail)
-sudo -u ai-worker docker exec ollama ollama list
-# Expected: ERROR: docker 'exec' is blocked by security policy
-
-# Test allowed command (should work)
-sudo -u ai-worker docker ps
-# Expected: CONTAINER ID   IMAGE   ...
-
-# Verify docker group membership
-groups ai-worker
-# Should show: ai-worker docker
-```
-
-## Troubleshooting
-
-If docker commands fail unexpectedly:
-
-```bash
-# Check which docker binary is being used
-which docker
-# If this shows /run/current-system/sw/bin/docker, the wrapper is not in PATH
-
-# Check if the wrapper is installed
-ls -la $(which docker)
-
-# Verify you're running as the right user
-whoami
-```
-
-If SSH connection fails:
-
-```bash
-# Check SSH key is authorized
-cat /home/ai-worker/.ssh/authorized_keys
-
-# Check SSH service
-systemctl status sshd
-```

modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix

@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-{ config, pkgs, lib, ... }:
-
-with lib;
-
-let
-  # Docker subcommands that are BLOCKED for ai-worker
-  # These commands allow file modification inside containers or data exfiltration.
-  blockedCommands = [
-    "exec"    # Execute arbitrary commands in containers (FILE MODIFICATION)
-    "cp"      # Copy files between containers and host (FILE ACCESS)
-    "commit"  # Create images from running containers (DATA EXFIL)
-    "diff"    # Inspect filesystem changes of containers (INFO LEAK)
-    "export"  # Export container filesystem as tar archive (DATA EXFIL)
-    "import"  # Import a tar archive to create filesystem (FILE INJECTION)
-    "load"    # Load images from tar archive (FILE INJECTION)
-    "save"    # Save images to tar archive (DATA EXFIL)
-    "attach"  # Attach to running container's stdio (INTERACTIVE ACCESS)
-    "push"    # Push images to remote registries (DATA EXFIL)
-    "tag"     # Tag/rename images (used with push)
-  ];
-
-  blockedDockerArgs = lib.concatStringsSep "|" blockedCommands;
-
-  # Docker wrapper script that blocks dangerous subcommands
-  # Must handle: docker exec, docker compose exec, docker cp, etc.
-  restrictedDockerScript = pkgs.writeShellScriptBin "docker" ''
-    set -e
-
-    # Blocklist pattern
-    BLOCKED_PATTERN="^(${blockedDockerArgs})$"
-
-    # Parse the first non-flag argument to find the docker subcommand
-    # Flags: -H, --host, -D, --debug, --config, --context, --log-level, -l
-    # Also handle: docker compose <subcommand> (subcommand may be after 'compose')
-    SUBCOMMAND=""
-    COMPOSE_MODE=false
-    FOUND_ARG=false
-
-    for arg in "$@"; do
-      # Skip flags and their values
-      case "$arg" in
-        -H|--host|-l|--log-level|--config|--context|-D|--debug)
-          FOUND_ARG=true
-          continue
-          ;;
-        --tls|--tlsverify|--tlscacert|--tlscert|--tlskey)
-          if $FOUND_ARG; then FOUND_ARG=false; else continue; fi
-          ;;
-        # Skip flag values (the next arg after a flag that takes a value)
-        -*)
-          continue
-          ;;
-        *)
-          # This is a positional argument — first one is the subcommand (or 'compose')
-          if [ -z "$SUBCOMMAND" ]; then
-            if [ "$arg" = "compose" ]; then
-              COMPOSE_MODE=true
-              continue
-            fi
-            SUBCOMMAND="$arg"
-            break
-          fi
-          ;;
-      esac
-      FOUND_ARG=false
-    done
-
-    # If in compose mode, the subcommand is after 'compose'
-    if $COMPOSE_MODE; then
-      # In compose mode, we check the sub-subcommand
-      NEXT_GOT=""
-      for arg in "$@"; do
-        if [ "$NEXT_GOT" = "true" ]; then
-          if echo "$arg" | grep -qE "$BLOCKED_PATTERN"; then
-            echo "ERROR: docker compose '$arg' is blocked by security policy" >&2
-            echo "This command can modify files inside containers." >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          break
-        fi
-        if [ "$arg" = "compose" ]; then
-          NEXT_GOT="true"
-        fi
-      done
-    fi
-
-    # Check if the subcommand is blocked
-    if [ -n "$SUBCOMMAND" ]; then
-      if echo "$SUBCOMMAND" | grep -qE "$BLOCKED_PATTERN"; then
-        echo "ERROR: docker '$SUBCOMMAND' is blocked by security policy" >&2
-        echo "This command can modify files inside containers." >&2
-        echo "" >&2
-        echo "Allowed commands: ps, images, inspect, logs, start, stop, restart," >&2
-        echo "  rm, rmi, pull, build, run, compose, system, network ls, volume ls" >&2
-        exit 1
-      fi
-    fi
-
-    # Execute the real docker binary
-    exec ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker "$@"
-  '';
-in
-{
-  options.services.aiWorkerAccess = mkOption {
-    type = types.bool;
-    default = false;
-    description = "Enable AI worker SSH access with restricted docker commands";
-  };
-
-  config = mkIf config.services.aiWorkerAccess {
-    # ai-worker is in docker group for normal docker operations
-    users.groups.docker.members = [ "ai-worker" ];
-
-    # Install the docker wrapper for ai-worker
-    # This puts a filtered 'docker' script in ai-worker's PATH that blocks
-    # dangerous commands like exec, cp, commit, etc.
-    # The real docker binary is still available at its store path, but the
-    # wrapper intercepts it because ~/.nix-profile/bin/ comes before /run/.../sw/bin/ in PATH.
-    users.users.ai-worker.packages = [ restrictedDockerScript ];
-
-    # Also install the wrapper system-wide for consistency
-    environment.systemPackages = [ restrictedDockerScript ];
-  };
-}

modules/nixos/services/ollama_init_custom_models.nix

@@ -1,87 +1,67 @@
 { pkgs, ... }: {
   systemd.services.init-ollama-model = {
     description = "Initialize LLM models with extra context in Ollama Docker";
-    
-    # On s'assure que Docker tourne avant de lancer ce script
-    after = [ "docker.service" ];
+    after = [ "docker-ollama.service" ];
     wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
-    
     script = ''
-      # Fonction de création asynchrone pour ne pas bloquer le démarrage
-      (
-        echo "Starting asynchronous Ollama initialization..."
-        
-        # Attente d'Ollama (maximum 120 secondes pour éviter une boucle infinie)
-        TIMEOUT=60
-        COUNT=0
-        while ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s -f http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/tags > /dev/null; do
-          if [ $COUNT -ge $TIMEOUT ]; then
-            echo "Ollama did not become ready in time. Exiting."
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "Waiting for Ollama API to be reachable..."
-          sleep 5
-          COUNT=$((COUNT + 5))
-        done
+      # Wait for Ollama
+      while ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s http://localhost:11434/api/tags > /dev/null; do
+        sleep 2
+      done
 
-        create_model_if_missing() {
-          local model_name=$1
-          local base_model=$2
+      create_model_if_missing() {
+        local model_name=$1
+        local base_model=$2
+        if ! ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama list | grep -q "$model_name"; then
+          echo "$model_name not found, creating from $base_model..."
           
-          # Vérification robuste via l'API HTTP d'Ollama plutôt que docker exec (évite les conflits de tty)
-          if ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/tags | ${pkgs.jq}/bin/jq -e ".models[] | select(.name == \"$model_name\")" > /dev/null; then
-            echo "$model_name not found, creating from $base_model..."
-            
-            # Utilisation d'un fichier temporaire sur l'hôte pour l'injecter proprement dans Docker
-            TMP_FILE=$(mktemp)
-            cat <<EOF > "$TMP_FILE"
+          # We use a custom TEMPLATE block to strip the 'currentDate' function 
+          # which is unsupported in Ollama 0.5.7 but present in Devstral's default manifest.
+          ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama sh -c "cat <<EOF > /root/.ollama/$model_name.modelfile
 FROM $base_model
-TEMPLATE """{{- if .System }}
+TEMPLATE \"\"\"{{- if .System }}
 [SYSTEM_PROMPT]
 {{ .System }}
 [/SYSTEM_PROMPT]
 {{- end }}
 {{- range .Messages }}
-{{- if eq .Role "user" }}
+{{- if eq .Role \"user\" }}
 [INST]
 {{ .Content }}
 [/INST]
-{{- else if eq .Role "assistant" }}
+{{- else if eq .Role \"assistant\" }}
 {{ .Content }}
 {{- end }}
-{{- end }}"""
+{{- end }}\"\"\"
 PARAMETER num_ctx 131072
 PARAMETER num_predict 4096
 PARAMETER num_keep 1024
 PARAMETER repeat_penalty 1.1
 PARAMETER top_k 40
-PARAMETER stop "[INST]"
-PARAMETER stop "[/INST]"
-PARAMETER stop "</s>"
-EOF
+PARAMETER stop \"[INST]\"
+PARAMETER stop \"[/INST]\"
+PARAMETER stop \"</s>\"
+EOF"
+          ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama create "$model_name" -f "/root/.ollama/$model_name.modelfile"
+          ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama rm "/root/.ollama/$model_name.modelfile"
+        else
+          echo "$model_name already exists, skipping."
+        fi
+      }
 
-            # Copie et création dans le conteneur
-            ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker cp "$TMP_FILE" ollama:/tmp/model.modelfile
-            ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama create "$model_name" -f /tmp/model.modelfile
-            ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama rm /tmp/model.modelfile
-            rm -f "$TMP_FILE"
-          else
-            echo "$model_name already exists, skipping."
-          fi
-        }
-
-        # Create Nemotron
-        create_model_if_missing "nemotron-3-nano:30b-128k" "nemotron-3-nano:30b"
-        
-        # Create Devstral
-        create_model_if_missing "devstral-small-2:24b-128k" "devstral-small-2:24b" 
-        
-      ) &
+      # Create Nemotron
+      create_model_if_missing "nemotron-3-nano:30b-128k" "nemotron-3-nano:30b"
+      
+      # Create Devstral
+      create_model_if_missing "devstral-small-2:24b-128k" "devstral-small-2:24b" 
+      
+      # create_model_if_missing "qwen2.5-coder:32b-128k" "qwen2.5-coder:32b"
+      
+      # create_model_if_missing "mistral-large-planner:123b" "mistral-large:123b-instruct-v2407-q4_K_S"
     '';
-
     serviceConfig = {
-      Type = "forking"; # Permet à systemd de savoir que le script passe en arrière-plan via '&'
-      User = "root";
+      Type = "oneshot";
+      RemainAfterExit = true;
     };
   };
 }

secrets/wireguard_preshared_key.age

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
-YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5IEdoTUQ4QSA3VG9Z
-MVFPVFc2VVJ3d0h0dmtBUnI3WHl2SzUxTkRZbjFCaGloWmV3dnd3ClcxdnVPeGd6
-SU4zR0Q0K1dtVjRRVHd0VW5XSFI0dVFpTjZnYk1DNjRxTVEKLT4gQzlgRy1ncmVh
-c2UKeUozOWgyUytSTVF0NjY2STBEb2VadwotLS0gblI3bmJCUWxxU3QrYTEyVFBI
-Snc4NC9rTkh0NnZYbUtxUE9hRWRkelpmMAq58fmH6cK13GeD7wGLxKmx10hmJeW4
-b7KqnCD1ZP7uG85s32xzVRwRG8RrG4xZo5nR9Mrtg1CoTSFfUGeFnf5xveN+Ej0X
-wDVB1LwC+Q==
------END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----

secrets/wireguard_private_key.age

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
-YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5IEdoTUQ4QSA5dzVG
-WUNvT3NlRmcrWS81bzJqSWlTekVYaDFFTE10SkI2dEgzaGpxcUI4Cmk5Y0FGYTRZ
-K0NGYzY3VUp4aS9ZZGRmWTgybDJFUURva2pZNmVOS3QxdEUKLT4gPnVRTCtldGMt
-Z3JlYXNlCk04OTJZeFRNeDI5aGpMVTk1ZTE0Y2FMMnFEMjlJalJpMHRlaTE4ZWIx
-d2lCRGQ5RHVjcktOMGJCb1VERlNWcTYKaSt0L1Z6dVJ0QWIyZkhsYzFEVjZSQWUr
-ZWpwVlo1TmhoUFJZdkEvR0gxNlVhcXF2ZTRnCi0tLSBLcmM2MThNVkdWclpHUXRr
-VTF6QVk2WUZlTXpZMVNLMlpBOFc3M1o5WjZzCs9xbPlIX+u5vRSQ/z9utu+I9S2c
-02DOsIb1kzxzb1OK91b8Kh4JucQSq3qkyEvRucsNn5QW8hIHDnRuND6EbPyN7p4S
-YB/F0dxSqgnq
------END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----

users/ai-worker.nix

@@ -4,26 +4,15 @@
     group = "ai-worker";
     home = "/home/ai-worker";
     createHome = true;
-    # ai-worker stays in docker group for normal docker operations (ps, start, stop, compose, ...)
-    # Dangerous commands (exec, cp, commit) are blocked by a wrapper script.
     extraGroups = [ "docker" ];
     shell = pkgs.bashInteractive;
     openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = [
       keys.users.ai-worker.main
     ];
-    # No password login - SSH key only
-    hashedPassword = "!";
   };
   users.groups.ai-worker = {};
-
-  # Enable restricted AI worker SSH access
-  # SECURITY: ai-worker is in docker group but docker commands are filtered:
-  #   ALLOWED: ps, images, logs, start, stop, restart, rm, rmi, pull, build, run, compose
-  #   BLOCKED: exec, cp, commit, diff, export, import, load, save, attach, push
-  # The filtering is done by a docker wrapper in ai-worker's PATH.
-  services.aiWorkerAccess = true;
-
-  # Restricted sudo for ai-worker - security checks only (not for docker)
+  
+  # Restricted sudo for ai-worker - security checks only
   security.sudo.extraRules = [
     {
       users = [ "ai-worker" ];
@@ -68,6 +57,15 @@
           command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/sshd -T";
           options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
         }
+        # Docker service checks
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker ps";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker inspect *";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
         # Network diagnostics
         {
           command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/ss -tlnp";