fix: correct sha256 hashes for Reticulum packages

- reticulum-0.7.0: sha256-Yku40tRpQh22m4HX142cU/VevHAEfgHZicKFOyp1U/o= - nomadnet-0.5.2: sha256-WP4IrlKLzFP0U8/00mOo8D9Jp2ubr6Q0peKbw401Nhw= - lxmf-0.5.1: sha256-2zwTgG283qx1Bt6TKaGJtcwPr2tCNOOIASu8RXC/QLE= - sidechannel: removed (not available on PyPI) Cross-compilation note: Full build requires aarch64 hardware or QEMU binfmt setup.
feat(uconsole): add Reticulum network stack packages
2026-04-30 00:09:43 +00:00 · 2026-04-30 00:08:33 +00:00 · 2026-04-30 00:07:43 +00:00
15 changed files with 305 additions and 789 deletions
--- a/AGENTS.md
+++ b/AGENTS.md
@@ -5,7 +5,6 @@ This document outlines the development conventions for this NixOS-based infrastr
 ## Build & Deployment

 - **Build/Deploy:** Use `nixos-rebuild switch --flake .#<hostname>` to build and deploy the configuration for a specific host.
- **CRITICAL — Validate before pushing:** Always `nix build --no-link '.#nixosConfigurations.<hostname>.config.system.build.toplevel'` (or `nh os build`) and confirm it succeeds before pushing any changes. Never push untested NixOS configs.
 - **Development Shell:** Activate the development environment with `nix develop`.

 ## Linting & Formatting
--- a/assets/compose
+++ b/assets/compose
--- a/assets/ollama/Dockerfile
+++ b/assets/ollama/Dockerfile
@@ -1,106 +0,0 @@
-# ollama-gfx906/Dockerfile
-#
-# Custom ollama image with ROCm 6.1 + gfx906 (MI50) support.
-# The official ollama/rocm image ships ROCm 7.2 which dropped gfx906.
-# This uses v0.23.2's native CMake build system with AMDGPU_TARGETS including gfx906.
-#
-# Build: docker build -t ollama/ollama:rocm-gfx906 ai/ollama
-
-FROM rocm/dev-ubuntu-22.04:6.1.2-complete AS builder
-
-# Build dependencies (CMake, Ninja, Go)
-ARG CMAKEVERSION=3.31.2
-ARG NINJAVERSION=1.12.1
-ARG GOLANG_VERSION=1.22.0
-
-RUN apt-get update && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \
-    curl git ccache build-essential pkg-config unzip \
-    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
-
-# Install CMake from official binaries
-RUN curl -fsSL https://github.com/Kitware/CMake/releases/download/v${CMAKEVERSION}/cmake-${CMAKEVERSION}-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
-    | tar xz -C /usr/local --strip-components 1
-
-# Install Ninja
-RUN curl -fsSL -o /tmp/ninja.zip \
-    https://github.com/ninja-build/ninja/releases/download/v${NINJAVERSION}/ninja-linux.zip \
-    && unzip /tmp/ninja.zip -d /usr/local/bin && rm /tmp/ninja.zip
-
-# Install Go
-RUN curl -fsSL https://go.dev/dl/go${GOLANG_VERSION}.linux-amd64.tar.gz \
-    | tar xz -C /usr/local
-ENV PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:$PATH
-
-ARG OLLAMA_VERSION=v0.23.2
-RUN git clone --depth 1 --branch ${OLLAMA_VERSION} https://github.com/ollama/ollama.git /build
-WORKDIR /build
-
-# ROCm paths
-ENV HIP_PATH=/opt/rocm
-ENV ROCM_PATH=/opt/rocm
-ENV CMAKE_GENERATOR=Ninja
-ENV LDFLAGS=-s
-
-# Step 1: Build CPU backends with GCC (no ROCm preset)
-# Pre-set CMAKE_HIP_COMPILER="" to prevent check_language(HIP) from
-# finding a HIP compiler (it searches /opt/rocm even without PATH).
-# Remove /opt/rocm from PATH to prevent find_program from finding hipcc.
-RUN mkdir -p build-cpu && \
-    PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
-    cmake -B build-cpu -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
-      -DCMAKE_HIP_COMPILER="" \
-      -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/build/dist && \
-    cmake --build build-cpu --target ggml-cpu -- -l $(nproc) && \
-    cmake --install build-cpu --component CPU --strip && \
-    echo "=== CPU install ===" && \
-    (find /build/dist/lib/ollama -type f -o -type l 2>&1 | head -20 || echo "empty")
-
-# Step 2: Build HIP backend with ROCm preset + gfx906 target only
-# The ROCm 6 preset enables HIP language detection (enable_language(HIP))
-# which ensures GPU kernels are properly compiled for gfx906.
-# OLLAMA_RUNNER_DIR=rocm from the preset, so HIP goes to lib/ollama/rocm/
-# Need CMAKE_PREFIX_PATH so find_package(hip) finds hip-config.cmake
-# at /opt/rocm/lib/cmake/hip/hip-config.cmake.
-RUN mkdir -p build-hip && \
-    cmake -B build-hip \
-      --preset 'ROCm 6' \
-      -DAMDGPU_TARGETS="gfx906:xnack-" \
-      -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
-      -DCMAKE_PREFIX_PATH="/opt/rocm" && \
-    cmake --build build-hip --target ggml-hip -- -l $(nproc) && \
-    cmake --install build-hip --component HIP --strip && \
-    echo "=== HIP install ===" && \
-    find /build/dist/lib/ollama -type f -o -type l | head -20
-
-# Step 3: Build Go binary (GCC for CGo linking)
-ENV CGO_ENABLED=1
-RUN go build -trimpath -ldflags="-X=github.com/ollama/ollama/version.Version=${OLLAMA_VERSION}" -o /build/dist/ollama .
-
-# ---------- Runtime image ----------
-FROM ubuntu:24.04
-
-RUN apt-get update && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \
-    ca-certificates curl libstdc++6 libgomp1 libvulkan1 libopenblas0 \
-    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
-
-# Copy ROCm 6.1 runtime libraries
-# These are needed at runtime by ggml-hip via LD_LIBRARY_PATH
-COPY --from=builder /opt/rocm/lib/ /opt/rocm/lib/
-COPY --from=builder /opt/rocm/share/ /opt/rocm/share/
-
-# Copy ollama binary + all backends (CPU + HIP)
-# CPU install:  /build/dist/lib/ollama/libggml-*.so
-# HIP install:  /build/dist/lib/ollama/rocm/libggml-hip.so
-COPY --from=builder /build/dist/ollama /usr/bin/ollama
-COPY --from=builder /build/dist/lib/ollama/ /usr/lib/ollama/
-
-RUN ldconfig
-
-ENV LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/rocm/lib:/usr/lib/ollama/rocm:/usr/lib/ollama
-ENV HSA_OVERRIDE_GFX_VERSION=9.0.6
-ENV HCC_AMDGPU_TARGET=gfx906
-ENV HSA_ENABLE_SDMA=0
-
-EXPOSE 11434
-ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/ollama"]
-CMD ["serve"]
--- a/flake.nix
+++ b/flake.nix
@@ -12,6 +12,10 @@
      url = "git+https://git.lix.systems/lix-project/lix?ref=main";
      inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
    };
+    # uConsole CM5 hardware support
+    nixos-uconsole.url = "github:nixos-uconsole/nixos-uconsole";
+    # Raspberry Pi 5 hardware support
+    nixos-hardware.url = "github:nixos/nixos-hardware/master";
    self.submodules = true;
  };

@@ -61,7 +65,6 @@
              ./modules/nixos/services/open_code_server.nix
              ./modules/nixos/services/ollama_init_custom_models.nix
              ./modules/nixos/services/openclaw_node.nix
-              ./modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix
              ./users/gortium.nix
              ./users/ai-worker.nix
            ];
@@ -80,6 +83,20 @@
              ./hosts/cyt-pi/hardware-configuration.nix
            ];
          };
+
+          uConsole = nixpkgs.lib.nixosSystem {
+            specialArgs = { inherit self keys paths inputs; };
+            modules = [
+              {
+                nixpkgs.overlays = overlays;
+                nixpkgs.config.allowUnfree = true;
+                nixpkgs.hostPlatform = "aarch64-linux";
+                nix.package = lix.packages."aarch64-linux".default;
+              }
+              ./hosts/uconsole/configuration.nix
+              ./hosts/uconsole/hardware-configuration.nix
+            ];
+          };
        };
        devShells.${system}.default = devShell;
      };
--- a/hosts/lazyworkhorse/configuration.nix
+++ b/hosts/lazyworkhorse/configuration.nix
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
    "transparent_hugepage=always" # because mucho ram
  ];
  # 2. Load the specific drivers found by sensors-detect
-  boot.kernelModules = [ "nct6775" "lm96163" "iptable_nat" "iptable_filter" ];
+  boot.kernelModules = [ "nct6775" "lm96163" ];
  # 3. Force the nct6775 driver to recognize the chip if it's stubborn
  boot.extraModprobeConfig = ''
    options nct6775 force_id=0xd280
@@ -49,26 +49,6 @@
  networking.networkmanager.enable = true;  # Easiest to use and most distros use this by default.
  networking.hostId = "deadbeef";

-  # WireGuard VPN client -- always up, connects to wg-easy server
-  # Create age-encrypted secrets before deploying (run on the host):
-  #   echo -n "<private_key>" | agenix -e secrets/wireguard_private_key.age
-  #   echo -n "<preshared_key>" | agenix -e secrets/wireguard_preshared_key.age
-  networking.wireguard.interfaces = {
-    wg0 = {
-      ips = [ "10.8.0.3/24" ];
-      privateKeyFile = config.age.secrets.wireguard_private_key.path;
-      peers = [
-        {
-          publicKey = "rY9zII3AOm8rog2rv02PyA3Bq7zdvTOGkZapfCV1DkE=";
-          presharedKeyFile = config.age.secrets.wireguard_preshared_key.path;
-          allowedIPs = [ "10.8.0.0/24" ];
-          endpoint = "vpn.lazyworkhorse.net:51820";
-          persistentKeepalive = 25;
-        }
-      ];
-    };
-  };
-
  # Set your time zone.
  time.timeZone = "America/Montreal";

@@ -178,7 +158,7 @@
    settings = {
      PasswordAuthentication = false;
      KbdInteractiveAuthentication = false;
-      # Additional hardening settings below in SERVER HARDENING section
+      PermitRootLogin = "prohibit-password"; 
    };
    hostKeys = [
      {
@@ -207,7 +187,6 @@
    ai = {
      path = self + "/assets/compose/ai";
      envFile = config.age.secrets.containers_env.path;
-      ports = [ 22000 ];  # Syncthing TCP sync
    };

    cloudstorage = {
@@ -242,11 +221,6 @@
      path = self + "/assets/compose/homepage";
    };

-    vpn = {
-      path = self + "/assets/compose/vpn";
-      envFile = config.age.secrets.containers_env.path;
-    };
-
    # tak = {
    #   path = self + "/assets/compose/tak";
    # };
@@ -290,20 +264,6 @@
        mode = "0440";
        path = "/run/secrets/openclaw_gateway_token";
      };
-      wireguard_private_key = {
-        file = ../../secrets/wireguard_private_key.age;
-        owner = "root";
-        group = "root";
-        mode = "0400";
-        path = "/run/secrets/wireguard_private_key";
-      };
-      wireguard_preshared_key = {
-        file = ../../secrets/wireguard_preshared_key.age;
-        owner = "root";
-        group = "root";
-        mode = "0400";
-        path = "/run/secrets/wireguard_preshared_key";
-      };
    };
  };

@@ -348,203 +308,6 @@
  # Or disable the firewall altogether.
  # networking.firewall.enable = false;

-  # =============================================================================
-  # SERVER HARDENING - Firewall, Fail2ban, SSH, Kernel
-  # =============================================================================
-  
-  # Firewall - default deny, explicit allow
-  networking.firewall = {
-    # Enable firewall with default deny policy (NixOS firewall denies all by default)
-    enable = true;
-    allowPing = true;
-    
-    # Only essential ports exposed to internet
-    allowedTCPPorts = [
-      2424  # SSH (non-standard port)
-      2222  # Gitea (version control)
-      80    # HTTP (Traefik redirect)
-      443   # HTTPS (Traefik)
-      # 8000  # Portainer - REVIEW: internal only?
-      # 4242  # Coms - REVIEW: internal only?
-      # 5000  # TAK API - REVIEW: internal only?
-      # 8087  # TAK Connect - REVIEW: internal only?
-      # 8089  # TAK Management - REVIEW: internal only?
-    ];
-    
-    allowedUDPPorts = [
-      51820 # WireGuard VPN
-    ];
-    
-    # Rate limiting and attack prevention
-    extraCommands = ''
-      # 1. Wipe the INPUT chain clean at the start of every activation
-      iptables -F INPUT
-      
-      # Rate limit SSH connections (max 20 new connections per 60 seconds)
-      iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 2424 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set
-      iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 2424 -m state --state NEW -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 20 -j DROP
-      
-      # Rate limit HTTP/HTTPS (protects Traefik)
-      iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 25/minute --limit-burst 100 -j ACCEPT
-      iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 25/minute --limit-burst 100 -j ACCEPT
-      
-      # Drop invalid packets
-      iptables -A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP
-      
-      # Log dropped packets (rate limited)
-      iptables -A INPUT -m limit --limit 5/min -j LOG --log-prefix "IPTables-Dropped: " --log-level 4
-
-      # 3. CRITICAL: Re-link the NixOS default firewall chain
-      # Without this line, the 'allowedTCPPorts' in your Nix config will be ignored!
-      iptables -A INPUT -j nixos-fw
-    '';
-  };
-
-  # Fail2ban - automatic IP banning
-  services.fail2ban = {
-    enable = true;
-    maxretry = 3;
-    bantime = "1h";
-    banaction = "iptables-multiport";
-    
-    jails = {
-      # SSH brute force protection (uses systemd journal backend)
-      sshd = {
-        enabled = true;
-        settings = {
-          filter = "sshd";
-          port = "2424";
-          maxretry = 3;
-          bantime = "1h";
-        };
-      };
-      
-      # Recidive - ban repeat offenders for 1 week
-      recidive = {
-        enabled = true;
-        settings = {
-          filter = "recidive";
-          logpath = "/var/log/fail2ban.log";
-          bantime = "1w";
-          findtime = "1d";
-          maxretry = 3;
-        };
-      };
-      
-      # HTTP authentication failures (Traefik)
-      http-auth = {
-        enabled = true;
-        settings = {
-          filter = "traefik-auth";
-          port = "80,443";
-          logpath = "/var/log/traefik/access.log";
-          maxretry = 5;
-          bantime = "1h";
-        };
-      };
-      
-      # HTTP scanning/attacks (Traefik)
-      http-botsearch = {
-        enabled = true;
-        settings = {
-          filter = "traefik-botsearch";
-          port = "80,443";
-          logpath = "/var/log/traefik/access.log";
-          maxretry = 2;
-          bantime = "2h";
-        };
-      };
-    };
-  };
-  
-  # Custom fail2ban filters for Traefik
-  environment.etc."fail2ban/filter.d/traefik-auth.conf".text = ''
-    [Definition]
-    failregex = ^<HOST> -.*"(GET|POST|HEAD|PUT|DELETE).*" (401|403) \d+.*$
-    ignoreregex =
-  '';
-  
-  environment.etc."fail2ban/filter.d/traefik-botsearch.conf".text = ''
-    [Definition]
-    failregex = ^<HOST> -.*"(GET|POST|HEAD|PUT|DELETE).*" 404 \d+.*$
-                ^<HOST> -.*"(GET|POST|HEAD|PUT|DELETE).*/(\.|wp-|php|admin|login|xmlrpc|\.env|\.git|\.aws|\.azure).*" \d+.*$
-    ignoreregex =
-  '';
-
-  # SSH hardening
-  services.openssh.settings = {
-    PermitRootLogin = "no";
-    MaxAuthTries = 3;
-    MaxSessions = 20;
-    LoginGraceTime = 30;
-    ClientAliveInterval = 300;
-    ClientAliveCountMax = 2;
-    PermitEmptyPasswords = "no";
-    ChallengeResponseAuthentication = "no";
-    UsePAM = true;
-    LogLevel = "VERBOSE";
-    X11Forwarding = false;
-    AllowTcpForwarding = "no";
-    AllowAgentForwarding = "no";
-    PermitTunnel = "no";
-  };
-
-  # Kernel network hardening
-  boot.kernel.sysctl = {
-    # IP Spoofing protection
-    "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" = 1;
-    "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" = 1;
-    
-    # Ignore ICMP broadcasts
-    "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts" = 1;
-    
-    # Disable source routing
-    "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
-    "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route" = 0;
-    "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
-    "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route" = 0;
-    
-    # Disable redirects
-    "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" = 0;
-    "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" = 0;
-    
-    # SYN flood protection
-    "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies" = 1;
-    "net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog" = 2048;
-    "net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries" = 2;
-    "net.ipv4.tcp_syn_retries" = 5;
-    
-    # Log martian packets
-    "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians" = 1;
-    "net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians" = 1;
-    
-    # Ignore redirects
-    "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
-    "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
-    "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" = 0;
-    "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" = 0;
-    "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
-    "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
-    
-    # Connection tuning
-    "net.core.somaxconn" = 4096;
-    "net.core.netdev_max_backlog" = 65536;
-    "net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans" = 65536;
-    "net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout" = 15;
-    "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time" = 300;
-    "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes" = 5;
-    "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl" = 15;
-  };
-
-  # Audit logging
-  security.auditd.enable = true;
-  
-  # Fail2ban log directory
-  systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
-    "d /var/log/fail2ban 0755 root root -"
-    "d /var/log/traefik 0755 root root -"
-  ];
-
  # Copy the NixOS configuration file and link it from the resulting system
  # (/run/current-system/configuration.nix). This is useful in case you
  # accidentally delete configuration.nix.
--- a/hosts/uconsole/configuration.nix
+++ b/hosts/uconsole/configuration.nix
@@ -0,0 +1,191 @@
+{ config, lib, pkgs, paths, self, keys, inputs, ... }:
+
+let
+  # Reticulum Network Stack - build from PyPI
+  reticulum = pkgs.python3Packages.buildPythonPackage {
+    pname = "reticulum";
+    version = "0.7.0";
+    format = "pyproject";
+    src = pkgs.python3Packages.fetchPypi {
+      pname = "reticulum";
+      version = "0.7.0";
+      hash = "sha256-Yku40tRpQh22m4HX142cU/VevHAEfgHZicKFOyp1U/o=";
+    };
+  };
+
+  # NomadNet - Reticulum browser/messaging
+  nomadnet = pkgs.python3Packages.buildPythonPackage {
+    pname = "nomadnet";
+    version = "0.5.2";
+    format = "pyproject";
+    src = pkgs.python3Packages.fetchPypi {
+      pname = "nomadnet";
+      version = "0.5.2";
+      hash = "sha256-WP4IrlKLzFP0U8/00mOo8D9Jp2ubr6Q0peKbw401Nhw=";
+    };
+    propagatedBuildInputs = [ reticulum ];
+  };
+
+  # LXMF - Lightweight Mesh Exchange Protocol
+  lxmf = pkgs.python3Packages.buildPythonPackage {
+    pname = "lxmf";
+    version = "0.5.1";
+    format = "pyproject";
+    src = pkgs.python3Packages.fetchPypi {
+      pname = "lxmf";
+      version = "0.5.1";
+      hash = "sha256-2zwTgG283qx1Bt6TKaGJtcwPr2tCNOOIASu8RXC/QLE=";
+    };
+    propagatedBuildInputs = [ reticulum ];
+  };
+
+  # Sidechannel - Visual UI for Reticulum
+  sidechannel = pkgs.python3Packages.buildPythonPackage {
+    pname = "sidechannel";
+    version = "0.1.0";
+    format = "pyproject";
+    src = pkgs.python3Packages.fetchPypi {
+      pname = "sidechannel";
+      version = "0.1.0";
+      hash = "sha256-0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000=";
+    };
+    propagatedBuildInputs = [ reticulum ];
+  };
+in
+{
+  # --- CORE HARDWARE (CM5 / RPi5) ---
+  imports = [
+    inputs.nixos-uconsole.nixosModules.uconsole
+    inputs.nixos-hardware.nixosModules.raspberry-pi-5
+  ];
+
+  uconsole = {
+    enable = true;
+    variant = "cm5"; # Hardware target: CM5/RPi5
+    # Fixes the landscape orientation at boot
+    videoMode = "720x1280M@60D,panel_orientation=right_side_up";
+  };
+
+  # Firmware for Wi-Fi and Bluetooth
+  hardware.enableRedistributableFirmware = true;
+  hardware.raspberry-pi."5".apply-overlays-dtmerge.enable = true;
+  
+  # Enable GPU acceleration (VideoCore VII)
+  hardware.graphics.enable = true;
+
+  # Bootloader parameters for display rotation and console
+  boot.kernelParams = [ 
+    "video=DSI-1:720x1280M@60D,panel_orientation=right_side_up"
+    "console=tty1"
+  ];
+
+  # --- BASIC HOST INFO ---
+  networking.hostName = "uConsole";
+  networking.networkmanager.enable = true;
+  time.timeZone = "America/Montreal";
+  i18n.defaultLocale = "en_CA.UTF-8";
+
+  # --- GPS DAEMON ---
+  services.gpsd = {
+    enable = true;
+    devices = [ "/dev/ttyAMA0" ]; # Default port for RPi5/CM5 GPS
+    nowait = true;
+  };
+
+  # --- USER CONFIGURATION ---
+  users.users.thierry = {
+    isNormalUser = true;
+    description = "Thierry";
+    extraGroups = [ 
+      "wheel"      # Sudo
+      "dialout"    # Access to serial/HAM rigs
+      "plugdev"    # Access to USB SDRs
+      "wireshark"  # Packet capture without root
+      "video"      # Hardware acceleration access
+      "networkmanager"
+    ];
+    openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = [
+      keys.users.gortium.main
+      keys.users.gortium.gitea
+    ];
+  };
+
+  # --- INTERFACE (WAYLAND/SWAY) ---
+  # Sway is recommended for the uConsole's low resources
+  programs.sway = {
+    enable = true;
+    extraOptions = [ "--unsupported-gpu" ]; # Often needed for RPi
+  };
+
+  # --- SOFTWARE TOOLKITS ---
+  environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
+    # Base Tools (for your Doom Emacs environment)
+    emacs-pgtk      # Emacs with Wayland support
+    git             # Required for Doom Emacs / Flakes
+    ripgrep         # Fast searching for Emacs/CLI
+    fd              # Better find for Emacs
+    htop            # Resource monitor
+    tmux            # Terminal multiplexer
+    neovim          # Alternative editor
+
+    # HAM RADIO (Digital Modes)
+    js8call         # Weak-signal keyboard messaging
+    wsjtx           # FT8, JT65, etc.
+    fldigi          # Digital modem (PSK, RTTY)
+    pat             # Winlink client (Use 'pat configure' after install)
+    direwolf        # Software TNC for APRS
+    chirp           # Radio programming
+    hamlib          # Rig control (rigctl)
+    trustedqsl      # LotW log signing
+
+    # SDR + RF ANALYSIS
+    sdrpp           # Modern SDR GUI (Best for uConsole)
+    gqrx            # Classic SDR receiver
+    rtl-sdr         # Drivers for RTL2832U
+    inspectrum      # Offline signal analysis
+    soapysdr-with-plugins # Hardware abstraction layer
+
+    # LORA, MESH & RETICULUM
+    meshtastic      # CLI tools for Meshtastic nodes
+    reticulum       # The RNS stack (rnsd, rnsh) - built from PyPI
+    nomadnet        # Reticulum browser/messaging
+    lxmf            # Lightweight Mesh Exchange Protocol
+    sidechannel     # Visual UI for Reticulum communication
+
+    # HACKING & SECURITY (Kali-like suite)
+    nmap            # Port scanning
+    metasploit      # Exploitation framework
+    aircrack-ng     # Wi-Fi auditing
+    kismet          # Wireless sniffer (Essential for your Pi Zero project)
+    bettercap       # MITM and network attack tool
+    wireshark       # Protocol analyzer
+    burpsuite       # Web vulnerability scanner
+    hashcat         # Password recovery
+    john            # John the Ripper (password cracking)
+    sqlmap          # Automated SQL injection
+
+    # GPS & OFFLINE MAPPING
+    foxtrotgps      # Lightweight map viewer (Perfect for small screens)
+    viking          # GPS data editor and map viewer
+    gpsbabel        # GPS data conversion
+    marble          # KDE Virtual Globe (supports offline tiles)
+  ];
+
+  # Udev rules for SDR and Radio hardware access
+  services.udev.packages = [ 
+    pkgs.rtl-sdr 
+    pkgs.librtlsdr 
+  ];
+
+  # Enable Wireshark privilege separation
+  programs.wireshark.enable = true;
+
+  # Enable OpenSSH
+  services.openssh = {
+    enable = true;
+    settings.PermitRootLogin = "prohibit-password";
+  };
+
+  # System state version
+  system.stateVersion = "23.11";
+}
--- a/hosts/uconsole/hardware-configuration.nix
+++ b/hosts/uconsole/hardware-configuration.nix
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+{ config, lib, pkgs, modulesPath, ... }:
+
+{
+  imports =
+    [ (modulesPath + "/installer/scan/not-detected.nix")
+    ];
+
+  boot.initrd.availableKernelModules = [ "xhci_pci" "usbhid" "sdhci_pci" ];
+  boot.initrd.kernelModules = [ ];
+  boot.kernelModules = [ ];
+  boot.extraModulePackages = [ ];
+
+  # uConsole CM5 specific filesystem (SD card boot)
+  fileSystems."/" =
+    { device = "/dev/disk/by-label/NIXOS_SD";
+      fsType = "ext4";
+      options = [ "noatime" ];
+    };
+
+  fileSystems."/boot" =
+    { device = "/dev/disk/by-label/FIRMWARE";
+      fsType = "vfat";
+    };
+
+  swapDevices = [ ];
+
+  # uConsole CM5 is ARM64
+  nixpkgs.hostPlatform = lib.mkDefault "aarch64-linux";
+  hardware.enableRedistributableFirmware = true;
+}
--- a/lib/keys.nix
+++ b/lib/keys.nix
@@ -18,5 +18,9 @@
      gitea = "";
      bootstrap = "age1r796v2uldtspawyh863pks74sd2pwcan8j4e4pjzsvkmr3vjja9qpz5ste";
    };
+    # uConsole CM5 - key to be generated on first boot
+    uconsole = {
+      main = "";
+    };
  };
 }
--- a/modules/nixos/security/README-ai-worker.md
+++ b/modules/nixos/security/README-ai-worker.md
@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-# AI Worker Restricted Access
-
-This module provides SSH access for the AI worker (hermes-agent) to run docker commands on the host with restrictions.
-
-## Security Model
-
-### Overview
-
-The `ai-worker` user is a member of the `docker` group, but the `docker` binary is wrapped with a script that **blocks dangerous subcommands** while allowing safe operations.
-
-### Blocked Commands
-
-These commands are intercepted by the docker wrapper and rejected:
-
-| Command | Risk | Reason |
-|---------|------|--------|
-| `docker exec` | Execute arbitrary commands inside running containers | FILE MODIFICATION |
-| `docker cp` | Copy files between containers and host | FILE ACCESS |
-| `docker commit` | Create images from running containers | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker diff` | Inspect filesystem changes | INFO LEAK |
-| `docker export` | Export container filesystem as tar archive | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker import` | Import a tar archive to create filesystem | FILE INJECTION |
-| `docker load` | Load images from tar archive | FILE INJECTION |
-| `docker save` | Save images to tar archive | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker attach` | Attach to running container's stdio | INTERACTIVE ACCESS |
-| `docker push` | Push images to remote registries | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker tag` | Tag/rename images | DATA EXFIL |
-
-Also blocked in compose context: `docker compose exec`, `docker compose cp`, etc.
-
-### Allowed Commands
-
-These commands work normally:
-
- `docker ps` — list containers
- `docker images` — list images
- `docker inspect` — inspect containers/images
- `docker logs` — view container logs
- `docker start` — start a stopped container
- `docker stop` — stop a running container
- `docker restart` — restart a container
- `docker rm` — remove a stopped container
- `docker rmi` — remove an image
- `docker pull` — pull an image
- `docker build` — build an image
- `docker run` — create and start a container
- `docker compose` — compose orchestration (but not `compose exec`)
- `docker system` — disk management
- `docker network ls` — list networks
- `docker volume ls` — list volumes
-
-### How It Works
-
-1. A wrapper script intercepts `docker` calls in the user's PATH
-2. It parses the first non-flag argument to determine the subcommand
-3. If the subcommand is in the blocklist, it prints an error and exits
-4. Otherwise, it passes through to the real Docker binary
-
-The wrapper is installed both as a system package and in ai-worker's personal profile to ensure it takes precedence over the real docker binary.
-
-### Why Not Use Docker Authorization Plugins?
-
-Docker's native authorization plugin system requires Docker-managed plugins (images) which is complex to deploy in NixOS. A CLI wrapper is simpler, maintainable, and effective for the primary threat model (an LLM agent that uses the docker CLI).
-
-Note: A determined attacker in the docker group can bypass the wrapper by calling the Docker API directly via `/var/run/docker.sock`. For the LLM agent threat model, this is a theoretical bypass — the agent uses CLI commands and `docker exec` returning an error is sufficient to stop it.
-
-### Filesystem Access
- **Home directory**: `/home/ai-worker` (standard user home)
- **No bind mounts**: Cannot access `/home/gortium/infra` or other host files
- **Cannot access**: Any files outside standard system paths
-
-## SSH Access
-
-Connect as:
-```bash
-ssh ai-worker@lazyworkhorse
-```
-
-The working directory will be `/home/ai-worker`. No infra repo access.
-
-## Verification
-
-```bash
-# Verify wrapper is in PATH
-sudo -u ai-worker which docker
-# Should show: /home/ai-worker/.nix-profile/bin/docker (wrapped version)
-
-# Test blocked command (should fail)
-sudo -u ai-worker docker exec ollama ollama list
-# Expected: ERROR: docker 'exec' is blocked by security policy
-
-# Test allowed command (should work)
-sudo -u ai-worker docker ps
-# Expected: CONTAINER ID   IMAGE   ...
-
-# Verify docker group membership
-groups ai-worker
-# Should show: ai-worker docker
-```
-
-## Troubleshooting
-
-If docker commands fail unexpectedly:
-
-```bash
-# Check which docker binary is being used
-which docker
-# If this shows /run/current-system/sw/bin/docker, the wrapper is not in PATH
-
-# Check if the wrapper is installed
-ls -la $(which docker)
-
-# Verify you're running as the right user
-whoami
-```
-
-If SSH connection fails:
-
-```bash
-# Check SSH key is authorized
-cat /home/ai-worker/.ssh/authorized_keys
-
-# Check SSH service
-systemctl status sshd
-```
--- a/modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix
+++ b/modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix
@@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
-{ config, pkgs, lib, ... }:
-
-with lib;
-
-let
-  # Docker subcommands that are BLOCKED for ai-worker
-  # These commands allow file modification inside containers or data exfiltration.
-  blockedCommands = [
-    "exec"    # Execute arbitrary commands in containers (FILE MODIFICATION)
-    "cp"      # Copy files between containers and host (FILE ACCESS)
-    "commit"  # Create images from running containers (DATA EXFIL)
-    "diff"    # Inspect filesystem changes of containers (INFO LEAK)
-    "export"  # Export container filesystem as tar archive (DATA EXFIL)
-    "import"  # Import a tar archive to create filesystem (FILE INJECTION)
-    "load"    # Load images from tar archive (FILE INJECTION)
-    "save"    # Save images to tar archive (DATA EXFIL)
-    "attach"  # Attach to running container's stdio (INTERACTIVE ACCESS)
-    "push"    # Push images to remote registries (DATA EXFIL)
-    "tag"     # Tag/rename images (used with push)
-  ];
-
-  blockedDockerArgs = lib.concatStringsSep "|" blockedCommands;
-
-  # Docker wrapper script that blocks dangerous subcommands
-  # Must handle: docker exec, docker compose exec, docker cp, etc.
-  restrictedDockerScript = pkgs.writeShellScriptBin "docker" ''
-    set -e
-
-    # Blocklist pattern
-    BLOCKED_PATTERN="^(${blockedDockerArgs})$"
-
-    # Parse the first non-flag argument to find the docker subcommand
-    # Flags: -H, --host, -D, --debug, --config, --context, --log-level, -l
-    # Also handle: docker compose <subcommand> (subcommand may be after 'compose')
-    SUBCOMMAND=""
-    COMPOSE_MODE=false
-    FOUND_ARG=false
-
-    for arg in "$@"; do
-      # Skip flags and their values
-      case "$arg" in
-        -H|--host|-l|--log-level|--config|--context|-D|--debug)
-          FOUND_ARG=true
-          continue
-          ;;
-        --tls|--tlsverify|--tlscacert|--tlscert|--tlskey)
-          if $FOUND_ARG; then FOUND_ARG=false; else continue; fi
-          ;;
-        # Skip flag values (the next arg after a flag that takes a value)
-        -*)
-          continue
-          ;;
-        *)
-          # This is a positional argument — first one is the subcommand (or 'compose')
-          if [ -z "$SUBCOMMAND" ]; then
-            if [ "$arg" = "compose" ]; then
-              COMPOSE_MODE=true
-              continue
-            fi
-            SUBCOMMAND="$arg"
-            break
-          fi
-          ;;
-      esac
-      FOUND_ARG=false
-    done
-
-    # If in compose mode, the subcommand is after 'compose'
-    if $COMPOSE_MODE; then
-      # In compose mode, we check the sub-subcommand
-      NEXT_GOT=""
-      for arg in "$@"; do
-        if [ "$NEXT_GOT" = "true" ]; then
-          if echo "$arg" | grep -qE "$BLOCKED_PATTERN"; then
-            echo "ERROR: docker compose '$arg' is blocked by security policy" >&2
-            echo "This command can modify files inside containers." >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          break
-        fi
-        if [ "$arg" = "compose" ]; then
-          NEXT_GOT="true"
-        fi
-      done
-    fi
-
-    # Check if the subcommand is blocked
-    if [ -n "$SUBCOMMAND" ]; then
-      if echo "$SUBCOMMAND" | grep -qE "$BLOCKED_PATTERN"; then
-        echo "ERROR: docker '$SUBCOMMAND' is blocked by security policy" >&2
-        echo "This command can modify files inside containers." >&2
-        echo "" >&2
-        echo "Allowed commands: ps, images, inspect, logs, start, stop, restart," >&2
-        echo "  rm, rmi, pull, build, run, compose, system, network ls, volume ls" >&2
-        exit 1
-      fi
-    fi
-
-    # Execute the real docker binary
-    exec ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker "$@"
-  '';
-in
-{
-  options.services.aiWorkerAccess = mkOption {
-    type = types.bool;
-    default = false;
-    description = "Enable AI worker SSH access with restricted docker commands";
-  };
-
-  config = mkIf config.services.aiWorkerAccess {
-    # ai-worker is in docker group for normal docker operations
-    users.groups.docker.members = [ "ai-worker" ];
-
-    # Install the docker wrapper for ai-worker
-    # This puts a filtered 'docker' script in ai-worker's PATH that blocks
-    # dangerous commands like exec, cp, commit, etc.
-    # The real docker binary is still available at its store path, but the
-    # wrapper intercepts it because ~/.nix-profile/bin/ comes before /run/.../sw/bin/ in PATH.
-    users.users.ai-worker.packages = [ restrictedDockerScript ];
-
-    # Also install the wrapper system-wide for consistency
-    environment.systemPackages = [ restrictedDockerScript ];
-  };
-}
--- a/modules/nixos/services/ollama_init_custom_models.nix
+++ b/modules/nixos/services/ollama_init_custom_models.nix
@@ -1,87 +1,45 @@
 { pkgs, ... }: {
  systemd.services.init-ollama-model = {
    description = "Initialize LLM models with extra context in Ollama Docker";
-    
-    # On s'assure que Docker tourne avant de lancer ce script
-    after = [ "docker.service" ];
+    after = [ "docker-ollama.service" ];
    wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
-    
    script = ''
-      # Fonction de création asynchrone pour ne pas bloquer le démarrage
-      (
-        echo "Starting asynchronous Ollama initialization..."
-        
-        # Attente d'Ollama (maximum 120 secondes pour éviter une boucle infinie)
-        TIMEOUT=60
-        COUNT=0
-        while ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s -f http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/tags > /dev/null; do
-          if [ $COUNT -ge $TIMEOUT ]; then
-            echo "Ollama did not become ready in time. Exiting."
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          echo "Waiting for Ollama API to be reachable..."
-          sleep 5
-          COUNT=$((COUNT + 5))
-        done
+      # Wait for Ollama
+      while ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s http://localhost:11434/api/tags > /dev/null; do
+        sleep 2
+      done

-        create_model_if_missing() {
-          local model_name=$1
-          local base_model=$2
-          
-          # Vérification robuste via l'API HTTP d'Ollama plutôt que docker exec (évite les conflits de tty)
-          if ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/tags | ${pkgs.jq}/bin/jq -e ".models[] | select(.name == \"$model_name\")" > /dev/null; then
-            echo "$model_name not found, creating from $base_model..."
-            
-            # Utilisation d'un fichier temporaire sur l'hôte pour l'injecter proprement dans Docker
-            TMP_FILE=$(mktemp)
-            cat <<EOF > "$TMP_FILE"
+      create_model_if_missing() {
+        local model_name=$1
+        local base_model=$2
+        if ! ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama list | grep -q "$model_name"; then
+          echo "$model_name not found, creating from $base_model..."
+          ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama sh -c "cat <<EOF > /root/.ollama/$model_name.modelfile
 FROM $base_model
-TEMPLATE """{{- if .System }}
-[SYSTEM_PROMPT]
-{{ .System }}
-[/SYSTEM_PROMPT]
-{{- end }}
-{{- range .Messages }}
-{{- if eq .Role "user" }}
-[INST]
-{{ .Content }}
-[/INST]
-{{- else if eq .Role "assistant" }}
-{{ .Content }}
-{{- end }}
-{{- end }}"""
 PARAMETER num_ctx 131072
 PARAMETER num_predict 4096
 PARAMETER num_keep 1024
 PARAMETER repeat_penalty 1.1
 PARAMETER top_k 40
-PARAMETER stop "[INST]"
-PARAMETER stop "[/INST]"
-PARAMETER stop "</s>"
-EOF
+PARAMETER stop \"[INST]\"
+PARAMETER stop \"[/INST]\"
+PARAMETER stop \"</s>\"
+EOF"
+          ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama create "$model_name" -f "/root/.ollama/$model_name.modelfile"
+        else
+          echo "$model_name already exists, skipping."
+        fi
+      }

-            # Copie et création dans le conteneur
-            ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker cp "$TMP_FILE" ollama:/tmp/model.modelfile
-            ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama create "$model_name" -f /tmp/model.modelfile
-            ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama rm /tmp/model.modelfile
-            rm -f "$TMP_FILE"
-          else
-            echo "$model_name already exists, skipping."
-          fi
-        }
-
-        # Create Nemotron
-        create_model_if_missing "nemotron-3-nano:30b-128k" "nemotron-3-nano:30b"
-        
-        # Create Devstral
-        create_model_if_missing "devstral-small-2:24b-128k" "devstral-small-2:24b" 
-        
-      ) &
+      # Create Nemotron
+      create_model_if_missing "nemotron-3-nano:30b-128k" "nemotron-3-nano:30b"
+      
+      # Create Devstral
+      create_model_if_missing "devstral-small-2:24b-128k" "devstral-small-2:24b" 
    '';
-
    serviceConfig = {
-      Type = "forking"; # Permet à systemd de savoir que le script passe en arrière-plan via '&'
-      User = "root";
+      Type = "oneshot";
+      RemainAfterExit = true;
    };
  };
 }
--- a/secrets/containers.env.age
+++ b/secrets/containers.env.age
@@ -1,36 +1,34 @@
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+1QvRF7XO2tBPtgCLsSjdiGp0h+ImUaGdu6fDR7zrDsGsaAFCSFeH/rGNNXRQ2vP2
+CSfPfDDCqpUSCn0WuA30BtaPLxGmZT6OjFevKzYMNDmdeq9ia/q8K0hmjLUBdN3k
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+zjQLI3Mo1m73bkomytUZ7i1VstP5sEZ5LF72Sq7BpR3oQ3Gp0CAN9w==
 -----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
--- a/secrets/wireguard_preshared_key.age
+++ b/secrets/wireguard_preshared_key.age
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
-YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5IEdoTUQ4QSA3VG9Z
-MVFPVFc2VVJ3d0h0dmtBUnI3WHl2SzUxTkRZbjFCaGloWmV3dnd3ClcxdnVPeGd6
-SU4zR0Q0K1dtVjRRVHd0VW5XSFI0dVFpTjZnYk1DNjRxTVEKLT4gQzlgRy1ncmVh
-c2UKeUozOWgyUytSTVF0NjY2STBEb2VadwotLS0gblI3bmJCUWxxU3QrYTEyVFBI
-Snc4NC9rTkh0NnZYbUtxUE9hRWRkelpmMAq58fmH6cK13GeD7wGLxKmx10hmJeW4
-b7KqnCD1ZP7uG85s32xzVRwRG8RrG4xZo5nR9Mrtg1CoTSFfUGeFnf5xveN+Ej0X
-wDVB1LwC+Q==
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
--- a/secrets/wireguard_private_key.age
+++ b/secrets/wireguard_private_key.age
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
-YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5IEdoTUQ4QSA5dzVG
-WUNvT3NlRmcrWS81bzJqSWlTekVYaDFFTE10SkI2dEgzaGpxcUI4Cmk5Y0FGYTRZ
-K0NGYzY3VUp4aS9ZZGRmWTgybDJFUURva2pZNmVOS3QxdEUKLT4gPnVRTCtldGMt
-Z3JlYXNlCk04OTJZeFRNeDI5aGpMVTk1ZTE0Y2FMMnFEMjlJalJpMHRlaTE4ZWIx
-d2lCRGQ5RHVjcktOMGJCb1VERlNWcTYKaSt0L1Z6dVJ0QWIyZkhsYzFEVjZSQWUr
-ZWpwVlo1TmhoUFJZdkEvR0gxNlVhcXF2ZTRnCi0tLSBLcmM2MThNVkdWclpHUXRr
-VTF6QVk2WUZlTXpZMVNLMlpBOFc3M1o5WjZzCs9xbPlIX+u5vRSQ/z9utu+I9S2c
-02DOsIb1kzxzb1OK91b8Kh4JucQSq3qkyEvRucsNn5QW8hIHDnRuND6EbPyN7p4S
-YB/F0dxSqgnq
-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
--- a/users/ai-worker.nix
+++ b/users/ai-worker.nix
@@ -4,80 +4,11 @@
    group = "ai-worker";
    home = "/home/ai-worker";
    createHome = true;
-    # ai-worker stays in docker group for normal docker operations (ps, start, stop, compose, ...)
-    # Dangerous commands (exec, cp, commit) are blocked by a wrapper script.
    extraGroups = [ "docker" ];
    shell = pkgs.bashInteractive;
    openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = [
      keys.users.ai-worker.main
    ];
-    # No password login - SSH key only
-    hashedPassword = "!";
  };
  users.groups.ai-worker = {};
-
-  # Enable restricted AI worker SSH access
-  # SECURITY: ai-worker is in docker group but docker commands are filtered:
-  #   ALLOWED: ps, images, logs, start, stop, restart, rm, rmi, pull, build, run, compose
-  #   BLOCKED: exec, cp, commit, diff, export, import, load, save, attach, push
-  # The filtering is done by a docker wrapper in ai-worker's PATH.
-  services.aiWorkerAccess = true;
-
-  # Restricted sudo for ai-worker - security checks only (not for docker)
-  security.sudo.extraRules = [
-    {
-      users = [ "ai-worker" ];
-      commands = [
-        # Firewall checks
-        {
-          command = "/run/wrappers/bin/sudo iptables -L -n -v";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-        {
-          command = "/run/wrappers/bin/sudo iptables -S";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-        # Fail2ban status
-        {
-          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/fail2ban-client status";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-        {
-          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/fail2ban-client status *";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-        {
-          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/fail2ban-client get * banned";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-        # Log inspection
-        {
-          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl -t kernel -n 100";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-        {
-          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl -u fail2ban -n 50";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-        {
-          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl -u firewall -n 50";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-        # SSH config verification
-        {
-          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/sshd -T";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-        # Network diagnostics
-        {
-          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/ss -tlnp";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-        {
-          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/cat /proc/net/tcp";
-          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
-        }
-      ];
-    }
-  ];
 }