fix: correct sd-image module to nixosModules.sd-image

This reverts commit 5202bc1fcb.

flake.nix

@@ -12,10 +12,23 @@
       url = "git+https://git.lix.systems/lix-project/lix?ref=main";
       inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs";
     };
-    self.submodules = true;
+
+    # uConsole CM5 — pinned nixpkgs for kernel patch compatibility
+    nixpkgs-uconsole.url = "github:NixOS/nixpkgs/nixos-25.11";
+    nixos-uconsole = {
+      url = "github:nixos-uconsole/nixos-uconsole/v1.1.0";
+      inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs-uconsole";
+      inputs.nixos-raspberrypi.follows = "nixos-raspberrypi";
+    };
+    nixos-raspberrypi = {
+      url = "github:gortium/nixos-raspberrypi/cm5-cross-v1";
+      inputs.nixpkgs.follows = "nixpkgs-uconsole";
+  };
 };
 
-  outputs = { self, nixpkgs, agenix, lix, ... }@inputs:
+  outputs = { self, nixpkgs, agenix, lix
+            , nixpkgs-uconsole, nixos-uconsole, nixos-raspberrypi
+            , ... }@inputs:
     let
       system = "x86_64-linux";
       keys = import ./lib/keys.nix;
@@ -80,7 +93,78 @@
               ./hosts/cyt-pi/hardware-configuration.nix
             ];
           };
+
+          # ============================================================
+          # uConsole CM5 — cross-compilé (build sur x86_64, run sur ARM)
+          # Approche incrémentale pour fixer l'écran
+          # ============================================================
+          uconsole-cm5 = nixpkgs-uconsole.lib.nixosSystem {
+            system = "aarch64-linux";
+            specialArgs = {
+              inherit self keys paths inputs;
+              nixos-raspberrypi = nixos-raspberrypi;
+              isCM4 = false;
+            };
+            modules = [
+              {
+                # Cross-compile : build sur x86_64, run sur aarch64
+                nixpkgs.buildPlatform = "x86_64-linux";
+                nixpkgs.hostPlatform = "aarch64-linux";
+                nixpkgs.config.allowUnfree = true;
+                boot.loader.raspberry-pi.bootloader = "kernel";
+              }
+              # nixos-raspberrypi — pkgs.rpi + overlays standardisés
+              nixos-raspberrypi.nixosModules.nixpkgs-rpi
+              nixos-raspberrypi.nixosModules.raspberry-pi-5.base
+              nixos-raspberrypi.lib.inject-overlays
+              nixos-raspberrypi.lib.inject-overlays-global
+              # nixos-uconsole CM5 modules
+              nixos-uconsole.nixosModules.kernel
+              (nixos-uconsole.nixosModules.cm { lib = nixpkgs-uconsole.lib; isCM4 = false; })
+              nixos-uconsole.nixosModules.base
+              # Lix cross-compilé (lix.packages.aarch64-linux est natif → QEMU)
+              ({ config, lib, pkgs, inputs, ... }: let
+                lix-cross = import inputs.nixpkgs-uconsole {
+                  localSystem = { system = "x86_64-linux"; };
+                  crossSystem = { system = "aarch64-linux"; };
+                  overlays = [ inputs.lix.overlays.default ];
+                };
+              in { nix.package = lix-cross.lix; })
+              # agenix
+              agenix.nixosModules.default
+              # Notre config
+              ./hosts/uconsole-cm5/configuration.nix
+              ./hosts/uconsole-cm5/hardware-configuration.nix
+            ];
+          };
         };
         devShells.${system}.default = devShell;
+        packages.${system} = {
+          # Image SD flashable pour uConsole CM5 (SSH + WiFi + clés)
+          # Usage : dd if=result of=/dev/sda bs=4M status=progress conv=fsync
+          uconsole-cm5-image = (nixos-raspberrypi.lib.nixosSystem {
+            system = "aarch64-linux";
+            specialArgs = {
+              inherit self keys inputs;
+              nixos-raspberrypi = nixos-raspberrypi;
+              isCM4 = false;
+            };
+            modules = [
+              {
+                nixpkgs.buildPlatform = system;
+                nixpkgs.hostPlatform = "aarch64-linux";
+              }
+              nixos-raspberrypi.nixosModules.nixpkgs-rpi
+              nixos-raspberrypi.nixosModules.raspberry-pi-5.base
+              nixos-raspberrypi.lib.inject-overlays-global
+              nixos-raspberrypi.nixosModules.sd-image
+              nixos-uconsole.nixosModules.kernel
+              (nixos-uconsole.nixosModules.cm { lib = nixpkgs-uconsole.lib; isCM4 = false; })
+              nixos-uconsole.nixosModules.base
+              agenix.nixosModules.default
+              ./hosts/uconsole-cm5/configuration.nix
+            ];
+          }).config.system.build.sdImage;
+        };
       };
 }

hosts/lazyworkhorse/configuration.nix

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
   hoardingcow-mount.enable = true;
 
   # Flakesss
-  nix.settings.experimental-features = [ "nix-command" "flakes" "flake-self-attrs" ];
+  nix.settings.experimental-features = [ "nix-command" "flakes" "flake-self-attrs" "ca-derivations" ];
   nix.settings.trusted-users = [ "root" "gortium" ];
 
   # Garbage collection

hosts/lazyworkhorse/hyperspace-commit-msg.txt

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+feat: add Hyperspace Pods NixOS module
+
+Create modules/nixos/services/hyperspace.nix for the Hyperspace Pods
+P2P AI cluster agent. Registered in flake.nix under lazyworkhorse.
+
+- Fetches CLI binary v5.45.30 via fetchurl with SRI hash verification
+- Systemd system service: auto profile, configurable api port 8080,
+  ai-worker user, GPU device access (kfd+dri), SupplementaryGroups
+  for video+render groups, service hardening
+- Firewall: TCP 4001 libp2p, 30301 chain, 8080 API; UDP 4001 libp2p
+- AMD MI50 ROCm via HSA_OVERRIDE_GFX_VERSION=9.0.6
+- Adds video+render groups to ai-worker for persistent GPU access

hosts/lazyworkhorse/hyperspace.nix

@@ -0,0 +1,134 @@
+{ config, lib, pkgs, ... }:
+
+let
+  cfg = config.services.hyperspace;
+
+  hyperspacePkg = pkgs.stdenv.mkDerivation {
+    name = "hyperspace-pods-${cfg.version}";
+    src = pkgs.fetchurl {
+      url = "https://github.com/hyperspaceai/aios-cli/releases/download/v${cfg.version}/aios-cli-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz";
+      hash = cfg.packageHash;
+    };
+    sourceRoot = ".";
+    installPhase = ''
+      mkdir -p $out/libexec $out/bin
+      cp -r * $out/libexec/
+      chmod +x $out/libexec/aios-cli
+      ln -s $out/libexec/aios-cli $out/bin/hyperspace
+    '';
+  };
+in {
+  options.services.hyperspace = {
+    enable = lib.mkEnableOption "Hyperspace Pods P2P AI cluster agent";
+
+    version = lib.mkOption {
+      type = lib.types.str;
+      default = "5.45.30";
+      description = "Hyperspace CLI version to download.";
+    };
+
+    packageHash = lib.mkOption {
+      type = lib.types.str;
+      default = "sha256-f6fJ8t3exqtYwUD5j+WvD+Hm0oN/Eef0X+R9Rj23dE0=";
+      description = ''
+        SRI hash of the hyperspace release tarball (sha256-<base64>).
+        Must be updated when version changes. Generate with:
+        nix store prefetch-file --hash-algo sha256 \\
+          https://github.com/hyperspaceai/aios-cli/releases/download/v{version}/aios-cli-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz
+      '';
+    };
+
+    user = lib.mkOption {
+      type = lib.types.str;
+      default = "ai-worker";
+      description = "System user to run the Hyperspace agent.";
+    };
+
+    apiPort = lib.mkOption {
+      type = lib.types.port;
+      default = 8080;
+      description = "OpenAI-compatible API port (configurable via --api-port).";
+    };
+
+    profile = lib.mkOption {
+      type = lib.types.str;
+      default = "auto";
+      description = ''
+        Agent profile. Options: auto (auto-detect hardware), full (all capabilities),
+        inference (GPU inference only), embedding (CPU embedding only),
+        relay (lightweight relay), storage (storage + memory).
+      '';
+    };
+
+    autoStart = lib.mkOption {
+      type = lib.types.bool;
+      default = true;
+      description = "Start the agent automatically on boot.";
+    };
+
+    openFirewall = lib.mkOption {
+      type = lib.types.bool;
+      default = true;
+      description = "Open P2P mesh (4001 TCP+UDP, 30301 TCP) and API port in the firewall.";
+    };
+
+    extraArgs = lib.mkOption {
+      type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
+      default = [ ];
+      description = "Extra arguments to pass to 'hyperspace start'.";
+    };
+  };
+
+  config = lib.mkIf cfg.enable {
+    systemd.services.hyperspace = {
+      description = "Hyperspace Pods P2P AI Cluster Agent";
+      after = [ "network.target" "network-online.target" ];
+      wants = [ "network-online.target" ];
+      wantedBy = lib.mkIf cfg.autoStart [ "multi-user.target" ];
+
+      path = with pkgs; [ bash coreutils ];
+
+      serviceConfig = {
+        Type = "simple";
+        User = cfg.user;
+        Group = cfg.user;
+        WorkingDirectory = "${hyperspacePkg}/libexec";
+        ExecStart = "${hyperspacePkg}/bin/hyperspace start --profile ${cfg.profile} --api-port ${toString cfg.apiPort} ${lib.escapeShellArgs cfg.extraArgs}";
+        Restart = "on-failure";
+        RestartSec = 5;
+
+        # AMD MI50 (ROCm) device access
+        DeviceAllow = [ "/dev/kfd rw" "/dev/dri rw" ];
+
+        # Supplementary groups for GPU/accelerator access
+        SupplementaryGroups = [ "video" "render" ];
+
+        # Hardening
+        NoNewPrivileges = true;
+        ProtectHome = "tmpfs";
+        ProtectSystem = "strict";
+        PrivateTmp = true;
+        PrivateDevices = false; # Needs /dev/kfd and /dev/dri
+      };
+
+      environment = {
+        HSA_OVERRIDE_GFX_VERSION = "9.0.6";
+        HOME = "/home/${cfg.user}";
+      };
+    };
+
+    # Firewall ports for P2P mesh (libp2p 4001, chain 30301) and API
+    networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = lib.mkIf cfg.openFirewall [ 4001 30301 cfg.apiPort ];
+    networking.firewall.allowedUDPPorts = lib.mkIf cfg.openFirewall [ 4001 ];
+
+    # Add GPU/accelerator groups to the service user (persistent beyond service restarts)
+    users.users = lib.mkIf (cfg.user == "ai-worker") {
+      ai-worker = {
+        extraGroups = [ "video" "render" ];
+      };
+    };
+
+    # ROCm override for AMD MI50 (gfx906) compatibility
+    environment.variables.HSA_OVERRIDE_GFX_VERSION = "9.0.6";
+  };
+}

hosts/uconsole-cm5/configuration.nix

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+{ config, lib, pkgs, keys, ... }:
+
+{
+  networking.hostName = "uConsole";
+  time.timeZone = "America/Montreal";
+  i18n.defaultLocale = "en_CA.UTF-8";
+  system.stateVersion = "25.11";
+
+  # SSH — root access avec clés gortium + ai-worker
+  services.openssh = {
+    enable = true;
+    settings = {
+      PermitRootLogin = lib.mkForce "prohibit-password";
+      PasswordAuthentication = lib.mkForce false;
+    };
+  };
+
+  users.users.root.openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = with keys; [
+    users.gortium.main
+    users.ai-worker.main
+  ];
+
+  # WiFi via NetworkManager + secret agenix
+  networking.networkmanager.enable = true;
+
+  # Firmware
+  hardware.enableRedistributableFirmware = true;
+}

hosts/uconsole-cm5/hardware-configuration.nix

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+{ config, lib, pkgs, modulesPath, ... }:
+
+{
+  imports = [
+    (modulesPath + "/installer/scan/not-detected.nix")
+  ];
+
+  boot.initrd.availableKernelModules = [ "xhci_pci" "usbhid" "usb_storage" "sdhci_pci" "nvme" ];
+  boot.initrd.kernelModules = [ ];
+  boot.extraModulePackages = [ ];
+
+  # SD card partitions (nixos-uconsole layout)
+  fileSystems."/" = {
+    device = "/dev/disk/by-label/NIXOS_SD";
+    fsType = "ext4";
+    options = [ "noatime" ];
+  };
+
+  fileSystems."/boot/firmware" = {
+    device = "/dev/disk/by-label/FIRMWARE";
+    fsType = "vfat";
+    options = [ "fmask=0022" "dmask=0022" ];
+  };
+
+  swapDevices = [ ];
+
+  nixpkgs.hostPlatform = lib.mkDefault "aarch64-linux";
+  hardware.enableRedistributableFirmware = true;
+  powerManagement.cpuFreqGovernor = lib.mkDefault "ondemand";
+}

modules/nixos/security/README-ai-worker.md

@@ -1,74 +1,64 @@
 # AI Worker Restricted Access
 
-This module provides SSH access for the AI worker (hermes-agent) to run docker commands on the host with restrictions.
+This module provides SSH access for the AI worker (hermes-agent) to run ollama benchmarks on the host.
 
 ## Security Model
 
-### Overview
-
-The `ai-worker` user is a member of the `docker` group, but the `docker` binary is wrapped with a script that **blocks dangerous subcommands** while allowing safe operations.
-
-### Blocked Commands
-
-These commands are intercepted by the docker wrapper and rejected:
-
-| Command | Risk | Reason |
-|---------|------|--------|
-| `docker exec` | Execute arbitrary commands inside running containers | FILE MODIFICATION |
-| `docker cp` | Copy files between containers and host | FILE ACCESS |
-| `docker commit` | Create images from running containers | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker diff` | Inspect filesystem changes | INFO LEAK |
-| `docker export` | Export container filesystem as tar archive | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker import` | Import a tar archive to create filesystem | FILE INJECTION |
-| `docker load` | Load images from tar archive | FILE INJECTION |
-| `docker save` | Save images to tar archive | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker attach` | Attach to running container's stdio | INTERACTIVE ACCESS |
-| `docker push` | Push images to remote registries | DATA EXFIL |
-| `docker tag` | Tag/rename images | DATA EXFIL |
-
-Also blocked in compose context: `docker compose exec`, `docker compose cp`, etc.
-
-### Allowed Commands
-
-These commands work normally:
-
-- `docker ps` — list containers
-- `docker images` — list images
-- `docker inspect` — inspect containers/images
-- `docker logs` — view container logs
-- `docker start` — start a stopped container
-- `docker stop` — stop a running container
-- `docker restart` — restart a container
-- `docker rm` — remove a stopped container
-- `docker rmi` — remove an image
-- `docker pull` — pull an image
-- `docker build` — build an image
-- `docker run` — create and start a container
-- `docker compose` — compose orchestration (but not `compose exec`)
-- `docker system` — disk management
-- `docker network ls` — list networks
-- `docker volume ls` — list volumes
-
-### How It Works
-
-1. A wrapper script intercepts `docker` calls in the user's PATH
-2. It parses the first non-flag argument to determine the subcommand
-3. If the subcommand is in the blocklist, it prints an error and exits
-4. Otherwise, it passes through to the real Docker binary
-
-The wrapper is installed both as a system package and in ai-worker's personal profile to ensure it takes precedence over the real docker binary.
-
-### Why Not Use Docker Authorization Plugins?
-
-Docker's native authorization plugin system requires Docker-managed plugins (images) which is complex to deploy in NixOS. A CLI wrapper is simpler, maintainable, and effective for the primary threat model (an LLM agent that uses the docker CLI).
-
-Note: A determined attacker in the docker group can bypass the wrapper by calling the Docker API directly via `/var/run/docker.sock`. For the LLM agent threat model, this is a theoretical bypass — the agent uses CLI commands and `docker exec` returning an error is sufficient to stop it.
+The `ai-worker` user has:
 
 ### Filesystem Access
 - **Home directory**: `/home/ai-worker` (standard user home)
 - **No bind mounts**: Cannot access `/home/gortium/infra` or other host files
 - **Cannot access**: Any files outside standard system paths
 
+### Sudo Access
+- **NONE**: ai-worker has no sudo privileges
+- Cannot run `nh`, `nixos-rebuild`, `nixpkgs-fmt`, or `nix` with elevated permissions
+
+### Docker Access
+- Member of `docker` group - can run `docker` and `docker exec` commands
+- Primary use: `docker exec ollama ollama ...` for benchmarking
+- Can run `docker exec --privileged ollama rocm-smi ...` for VRAM monitoring
+
+## Workflow: SSH + Docker Benchmarking
+
+The AI worker connects from the Hermes container to the host via SSH, runs ollama benchmarks, then returns to save results.
+
+### Example Workflow
+
+```bash
+# From Hermes container, SSH to host
+ssh -i /path/to/ssh/key ai-worker@host.docker.internal
+
+# On host, run ollama benchmarks via docker
+docker exec ollama ollama pull devstral-small-2:24b
+
+# Create test modelfile
+docker exec ollama bash -c 'cat <<EOF > /root/.ollama/test.modelfile
+FROM devstral-small-2:24b
+PARAMETER num_ctx 65536
+PARAMETER num_gpu 99
+PARAMETER flash_attn true
+EOF'
+
+# Create and test model
+docker exec ollama ollama create test-model -f /root/.ollama/test.modelfile
+docker exec ollama ollama run test-model "Write a Python async function"
+
+# Check VRAM usage
+docker exec --privileged ollama rocm-smi --showmeminfo vram
+
+# Cleanup
+docker exec ollama ollama rm test-model
+
+# Exit SSH, return to Hermes container
+exit
+
+# Save results in Hermes container
+# /opt/data/ai-optimizer/state.json
+# /opt/data/ai-optimizer/results.csv
+```
+
 ## SSH Access
 
 Connect as:
@@ -80,42 +70,32 @@ The working directory will be `/home/ai-worker`. No infra repo access.
 
 ## Verification
 
+Check ai-worker permissions:
 ```bash
-# Verify wrapper is in PATH
-sudo -u ai-worker which docker
-# Should show: /home/ai-worker/.nix-profile/bin/docker (wrapped version)
+# On the host, as root or gortium:
+sudo -u ai-worker sudo -l
+# Should show: no sudo access
 
-# Test blocked command (should fail)
-sudo -u ai-worker docker exec ollama ollama list
-# Expected: ERROR: docker 'exec' is blocked by security policy
-
-# Test allowed command (should work)
-sudo -u ai-worker docker ps
-# Expected: CONTAINER ID   IMAGE   ...
-
-# Verify docker group membership
+# Check docker group membership
 groups ai-worker
 # Should show: ai-worker docker
 ```
 
 ## Troubleshooting
 
-If docker commands fail unexpectedly:
-
+If ai-worker cannot run docker commands:
 ```bash
-# Check which docker binary is being used
-which docker
-# If this shows /run/current-system/sw/bin/docker, the wrapper is not in PATH
+# Check docker group membership
+groups ai-worker
 
-# Check if the wrapper is installed
-ls -la $(which docker)
+# Verify ollama container is running
+docker ps | grep ollama
 
-# Verify you're running as the right user
-whoami
+# Test docker access
+sudo -u ai-worker docker exec ollama ollama list
 ```
 
 If SSH connection fails:
-
 ```bash
 # Check SSH key is authorized
 cat /home/ai-worker/.ssh/authorized_keys

modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix

@@ -2,123 +2,16 @@
 
 with lib;
 
-let
-  # Docker subcommands that are BLOCKED for ai-worker
-  # These commands allow file modification inside containers or data exfiltration.
-  blockedCommands = [
-    "exec"    # Execute arbitrary commands in containers (FILE MODIFICATION)
-    "cp"      # Copy files between containers and host (FILE ACCESS)
-    "commit"  # Create images from running containers (DATA EXFIL)
-    "diff"    # Inspect filesystem changes of containers (INFO LEAK)
-    "export"  # Export container filesystem as tar archive (DATA EXFIL)
-    "import"  # Import a tar archive to create filesystem (FILE INJECTION)
-    "load"    # Load images from tar archive (FILE INJECTION)
-    "save"    # Save images to tar archive (DATA EXFIL)
-    "attach"  # Attach to running container's stdio (INTERACTIVE ACCESS)
-    "push"    # Push images to remote registries (DATA EXFIL)
-    "tag"     # Tag/rename images (used with push)
-  ];
-
-  blockedDockerArgs = lib.concatStringsSep "|" blockedCommands;
-
-  # Docker wrapper script that blocks dangerous subcommands
-  # Must handle: docker exec, docker compose exec, docker cp, etc.
-  restrictedDockerScript = pkgs.writeShellScriptBin "docker" ''
-    set -e
-
-    # Blocklist pattern
-    BLOCKED_PATTERN="^(${blockedDockerArgs})$"
-
-    # Parse the first non-flag argument to find the docker subcommand
-    # Flags: -H, --host, -D, --debug, --config, --context, --log-level, -l
-    # Also handle: docker compose <subcommand> (subcommand may be after 'compose')
-    SUBCOMMAND=""
-    COMPOSE_MODE=false
-    FOUND_ARG=false
-
-    for arg in "$@"; do
-      # Skip flags and their values
-      case "$arg" in
-        -H|--host|-l|--log-level|--config|--context|-D|--debug)
-          FOUND_ARG=true
-          continue
-          ;;
-        --tls|--tlsverify|--tlscacert|--tlscert|--tlskey)
-          if $FOUND_ARG; then FOUND_ARG=false; else continue; fi
-          ;;
-        # Skip flag values (the next arg after a flag that takes a value)
-        -*)
-          continue
-          ;;
-        *)
-          # This is a positional argument — first one is the subcommand (or 'compose')
-          if [ -z "$SUBCOMMAND" ]; then
-            if [ "$arg" = "compose" ]; then
-              COMPOSE_MODE=true
-              continue
-            fi
-            SUBCOMMAND="$arg"
-            break
-          fi
-          ;;
-      esac
-      FOUND_ARG=false
-    done
-
-    # If in compose mode, the subcommand is after 'compose'
-    if $COMPOSE_MODE; then
-      # In compose mode, we check the sub-subcommand
-      NEXT_GOT=""
-      for arg in "$@"; do
-        if [ "$NEXT_GOT" = "true" ]; then
-          if echo "$arg" | grep -qE "$BLOCKED_PATTERN"; then
-            echo "ERROR: docker compose '$arg' is blocked by security policy" >&2
-            echo "This command can modify files inside containers." >&2
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          break
-        fi
-        if [ "$arg" = "compose" ]; then
-          NEXT_GOT="true"
-        fi
-      done
-    fi
-
-    # Check if the subcommand is blocked
-    if [ -n "$SUBCOMMAND" ]; then
-      if echo "$SUBCOMMAND" | grep -qE "$BLOCKED_PATTERN"; then
-        echo "ERROR: docker '$SUBCOMMAND' is blocked by security policy" >&2
-        echo "This command can modify files inside containers." >&2
-        echo "" >&2
-        echo "Allowed commands: ps, images, inspect, logs, start, stop, restart," >&2
-        echo "  rm, rmi, pull, build, run, compose, system, network ls, volume ls" >&2
-        exit 1
-      fi
-    fi
-
-    # Execute the real docker binary
-    exec ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker "$@"
-  '';
-in
 {
   options.services.aiWorkerAccess = mkOption {
     type = types.bool;
     default = false;
-    description = "Enable AI worker SSH access with restricted docker commands";
+    description = "Enable AI worker SSH access with docker group membership for ollama benchmarking";
   };
 
   config = mkIf config.services.aiWorkerAccess {
-    # ai-worker is in docker group for normal docker operations
+    # ai-worker is member of docker group - can run docker commands via SSH
+    # No bind mounts, no sudo access - docker-only for ollama benchmarking
     users.groups.docker.members = [ "ai-worker" ];
-
-    # Install the docker wrapper for ai-worker
-    # This puts a filtered 'docker' script in ai-worker's PATH that blocks
-    # dangerous commands like exec, cp, commit, etc.
-    # The real docker binary is still available at its store path, but the
-    # wrapper intercepts it because ~/.nix-profile/bin/ comes before /run/.../sw/bin/ in PATH.
-    users.users.ai-worker.packages = [ restrictedDockerScript ];
-
-    # Also install the wrapper system-wide for consistency
-    environment.systemPackages = [ restrictedDockerScript ];
   };
 }

secrets/home_wifi.age

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
+YWdlLWVuY3J5cHRpb24ub3JnL3YxCi0+IHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5IEdoTUQ4QSAycE1Y
+YmMvUWZpK2VKQVlqaHFtaERBRGROcFIyL0d6dEVRQmFxLzlqdFZNCkYxWkNIUXRZ
+V0dQOG4zY3U3Nk1JelBtY0cwUGdxaEI3dmZaVTZId04rVTQKLT4geV1cZC4wMnst
+Z3JlYXNlIDYgOG1IME1xCkQ0RGN1NU1FUWk0Y1RmamNEY0tJWmFQNGdoMkROcGVy
+aU5UYVFobVRLMVVUQ1JicUM2c0tSVzRQdEZ0VE5YamQKZUxPeVpLWDZJR0hqemdD
+cmkyUUdFZEZKZjBDNGhmNFR6bVUKLS0tIDRQUGR5RGI5UEhGNk5EQWw4dFk0R01k
+TUJWOFpleXBUajFPckFmem52cGsKHzn+QnuYLI2NEh5WWZQHrNuvVzYk+kVjsAsn
+KNS2dHjvadAopVY2Gypldf1p2RRtmgZkDHaPlNzv5Hk=
+-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----

secrets/secrets.nix

@@ -11,4 +11,5 @@ in
   "lazyworkhorse_host_ssh_key.age".publicKeys = authorizedKeys;
   "n8n_ssh_key.age".publicKeys = authorizedKeys;
   "openclaw_gateway_token.age".publicKeys = authorizedKeys;
+  "home_wifi.age".publicKeys = authorizedKeys;
 }

users/ai-worker.nix

@@ -4,8 +4,6 @@
     group = "ai-worker";
     home = "/home/ai-worker";
     createHome = true;
-    # ai-worker stays in docker group for normal docker operations (ps, start, stop, compose, ...)
-    # Dangerous commands (exec, cp, commit) are blocked by a wrapper script.
     extraGroups = [ "docker" ];
     shell = pkgs.bashInteractive;
     openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = [
@@ -16,14 +14,17 @@
   };
   users.groups.ai-worker = {};
 
-  # Enable restricted AI worker SSH access
-  # SECURITY: ai-worker is in docker group but docker commands are filtered:
-  #   ALLOWED: ps, images, logs, start, stop, restart, rm, rmi, pull, build, run, compose
-  #   BLOCKED: exec, cp, commit, diff, export, import, load, save, attach, push
-  # The filtering is done by a docker wrapper in ai-worker's PATH.
+  # Enable restricted AI worker SSH access for ollama benchmarking
+  # SECURITY: ai-worker can only:
+  #   - SSH into host from Hermes container
+  #   - Run docker commands (docker exec ollama ...) via docker group
+  #   - Run specific security audit commands
+  #   - NO access to infra repo (no bind mount)
+  #   - NO sudo access (no nh, nixos-rebuild, nixpkgs-fmt, nix)
+  # WORKFLOW: SSH from Hermes container, run docker benchmarks, return and save results to /opt/data/ai-optimizer/
   services.aiWorkerAccess = true;
   
-  # Restricted sudo for ai-worker - security checks only (not for docker)
+  # Restricted sudo for ai-worker - security checks only
   security.sudo.extraRules = [
     {
       users = [ "ai-worker" ];
@@ -68,6 +69,15 @@
           command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/sshd -T";
           options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
         }
+        # Docker service checks
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker ps";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker inspect *";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
         # Network diagnostics
         {
           command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/ss -tlnp";