fix: restrict docker commands for ai-worker (wrapper blacklist)

SECURITY CHANGE: Keep ai-worker in docker group but block dangerous
docker subcommands via a wrapper script.

Approach:
- docker group membership preserved (ps, start, stop, compose still work)
- Docker binary wrapped with a script that blocks dangerous subcommands
- BLOCKED: exec, cp, commit, diff, export, import, load, save, attach, push, tag
- ALLOWED: ps, images, inspect, logs, start, stop, restart, rm, rmi,
  pull, build, run, compose, system, network ls, volume ls

The wrapper is installed in both system packages and ai-worker's
personal profile to ensure it takes precedence over the real docker.
This is effective for the LLM agent threat model — the agent uses CLI
commands and blocked subcommands simply return an error.

Files modified:
- users/ai-worker.nix — restored docker group, kept sudo audit rules
- modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix — added docker wrapper
  script with blacklist logic and NixOS module integration
- modules/nixos/security/README-ai-worker.md — documentation update

AGENTS.md

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ This document outlines the development conventions for this NixOS-based infrastr
 ## Build & Deployment
 
 - **Build/Deploy:** Use `nixos-rebuild switch --flake .#<hostname>` to build and deploy the configuration for a specific host.
+- **CRITICAL — Validate before pushing:** Always `nix build --no-link '.#nixosConfigurations.<hostname>.config.system.build.toplevel'` (or `nh os build`) and confirm it succeeds before pushing any changes. Never push untested NixOS configs.
 - **Development Shell:** Activate the development environment with `nix develop`.
 
 ## Linting & Formatting

assets/ollama/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+# ollama-gfx906/Dockerfile
+#
+# Custom ollama image with ROCm 6.1 + gfx906 (MI50) support.
+# The official ollama/rocm image ships ROCm 7.2 which dropped gfx906.
+# This uses v0.23.2's native CMake build system with AMDGPU_TARGETS including gfx906.
+#
+# Build: docker build -t ollama/ollama:rocm-gfx906 ai/ollama
+
+FROM rocm/dev-ubuntu-22.04:6.1.2-complete AS builder
+
+# Build dependencies (CMake, Ninja, Go)
+ARG CMAKEVERSION=3.31.2
+ARG NINJAVERSION=1.12.1
+ARG GOLANG_VERSION=1.22.0
+
+RUN apt-get update && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \
+    curl git ccache build-essential pkg-config unzip \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# Install CMake from official binaries
+RUN curl -fsSL https://github.com/Kitware/CMake/releases/download/v${CMAKEVERSION}/cmake-${CMAKEVERSION}-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
+    | tar xz -C /usr/local --strip-components 1
+
+# Install Ninja
+RUN curl -fsSL -o /tmp/ninja.zip \
+    https://github.com/ninja-build/ninja/releases/download/v${NINJAVERSION}/ninja-linux.zip \
+    && unzip /tmp/ninja.zip -d /usr/local/bin && rm /tmp/ninja.zip
+
+# Install Go
+RUN curl -fsSL https://go.dev/dl/go${GOLANG_VERSION}.linux-amd64.tar.gz \
+    | tar xz -C /usr/local
+ENV PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:$PATH
+
+ARG OLLAMA_VERSION=v0.23.2
+RUN git clone --depth 1 --branch ${OLLAMA_VERSION} https://github.com/ollama/ollama.git /build
+WORKDIR /build
+
+# ROCm paths
+ENV HIP_PATH=/opt/rocm
+ENV ROCM_PATH=/opt/rocm
+ENV CMAKE_GENERATOR=Ninja
+ENV LDFLAGS=-s
+
+# Step 1: Build CPU backends with GCC (no ROCm preset)
+# Pre-set CMAKE_HIP_COMPILER="" to prevent check_language(HIP) from
+# finding a HIP compiler (it searches /opt/rocm even without PATH).
+# Remove /opt/rocm from PATH to prevent find_program from finding hipcc.
+RUN mkdir -p build-cpu && \
+    PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
+    cmake -B build-cpu -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
+      -DCMAKE_HIP_COMPILER="" \
+      -DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/build/dist && \
+    cmake --build build-cpu --target ggml-cpu -- -l $(nproc) && \
+    cmake --install build-cpu --component CPU --strip && \
+    echo "=== CPU install ===" && \
+    (find /build/dist/lib/ollama -type f -o -type l 2>&1 | head -20 || echo "empty")
+
+# Step 2: Build HIP backend with ROCm preset + gfx906 target only
+# The ROCm 6 preset enables HIP language detection (enable_language(HIP))
+# which ensures GPU kernels are properly compiled for gfx906.
+# OLLAMA_RUNNER_DIR=rocm from the preset, so HIP goes to lib/ollama/rocm/
+# Need CMAKE_PREFIX_PATH so find_package(hip) finds hip-config.cmake
+# at /opt/rocm/lib/cmake/hip/hip-config.cmake.
+RUN mkdir -p build-hip && \
+    cmake -B build-hip \
+      --preset 'ROCm 6' \
+      -DAMDGPU_TARGETS="gfx906:xnack-" \
+      -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
+      -DCMAKE_PREFIX_PATH="/opt/rocm" && \
+    cmake --build build-hip --target ggml-hip -- -l $(nproc) && \
+    cmake --install build-hip --component HIP --strip && \
+    echo "=== HIP install ===" && \
+    find /build/dist/lib/ollama -type f -o -type l | head -20
+
+# Step 3: Build Go binary (GCC for CGo linking)
+ENV CGO_ENABLED=1
+RUN go build -trimpath -ldflags="-X=github.com/ollama/ollama/version.Version=${OLLAMA_VERSION}" -o /build/dist/ollama .
+
+# ---------- Runtime image ----------
+FROM ubuntu:24.04
+
+RUN apt-get update && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \
+    ca-certificates curl libstdc++6 libgomp1 libvulkan1 libopenblas0 \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+# Copy ROCm 6.1 runtime libraries
+# These are needed at runtime by ggml-hip via LD_LIBRARY_PATH
+COPY --from=builder /opt/rocm/lib/ /opt/rocm/lib/
+COPY --from=builder /opt/rocm/share/ /opt/rocm/share/
+
+# Copy ollama binary + all backends (CPU + HIP)
+# CPU install:  /build/dist/lib/ollama/libggml-*.so
+# HIP install:  /build/dist/lib/ollama/rocm/libggml-hip.so
+COPY --from=builder /build/dist/ollama /usr/bin/ollama
+COPY --from=builder /build/dist/lib/ollama/ /usr/lib/ollama/
+
+RUN ldconfig
+
+ENV LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/rocm/lib:/usr/lib/ollama/rocm:/usr/lib/ollama
+ENV HSA_OVERRIDE_GFX_VERSION=9.0.6
+ENV HCC_AMDGPU_TARGET=gfx906
+ENV HSA_ENABLE_SDMA=0
+
+EXPOSE 11434
+ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/ollama"]
+CMD ["serve"]

hosts/lazyworkhorse/configuration.nix

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
     "transparent_hugepage=always" # because mucho ram
   ];
   # 2. Load the specific drivers found by sensors-detect
-  boot.kernelModules = [ "nct6775" "lm96163" ];
+  boot.kernelModules = [ "nct6775" "lm96163" "iptable_nat" "iptable_filter" ];
   # 3. Force the nct6775 driver to recognize the chip if it's stubborn
   boot.extraModprobeConfig = ''
     options nct6775 force_id=0xd280
@@ -49,6 +49,26 @@
   networking.networkmanager.enable = true;  # Easiest to use and most distros use this by default.
   networking.hostId = "deadbeef";
 
+  # WireGuard VPN client -- always up, connects to wg-easy server
+  # Create age-encrypted secrets before deploying (run on the host):
+  #   echo -n "<private_key>" | agenix -e secrets/wireguard_private_key.age
+  #   echo -n "<preshared_key>" | agenix -e secrets/wireguard_preshared_key.age
+  networking.wireguard.interfaces = {
+    wg0 = {
+      ips = [ "10.8.0.3/24" ];
+      privateKeyFile = config.age.secrets.wireguard_private_key.path;
+      peers = [
+        {
+          publicKey = "rY9zII3AOm8rog2rv02PyA3Bq7zdvTOGkZapfCV1DkE=";
+          presharedKeyFile = config.age.secrets.wireguard_preshared_key.path;
+          allowedIPs = [ "10.8.0.0/24" ];
+          endpoint = "vpn.lazyworkhorse.net:51820";
+          persistentKeepalive = 25;
+        }
+      ];
+    };
+  };
+
   # Set your time zone.
   time.timeZone = "America/Montreal";
 
@@ -158,7 +178,7 @@
     settings = {
       PasswordAuthentication = false;
       KbdInteractiveAuthentication = false;
-      PermitRootLogin = "prohibit-password"; 
+      # Additional hardening settings below in SERVER HARDENING section
     };
     hostKeys = [
       {
@@ -187,6 +207,7 @@
     ai = {
       path = self + "/assets/compose/ai";
       envFile = config.age.secrets.containers_env.path;
+      ports = [ 22000 ];  # Syncthing TCP sync
     };
 
     cloudstorage = {
@@ -221,6 +242,11 @@
       path = self + "/assets/compose/homepage";
     };
 
+    vpn = {
+      path = self + "/assets/compose/vpn";
+      envFile = config.age.secrets.containers_env.path;
+    };
+
     # tak = {
     #   path = self + "/assets/compose/tak";
     # };
@@ -264,6 +290,20 @@
         mode = "0440";
         path = "/run/secrets/openclaw_gateway_token";
       };
+      wireguard_private_key = {
+        file = ../../secrets/wireguard_private_key.age;
+        owner = "root";
+        group = "root";
+        mode = "0400";
+        path = "/run/secrets/wireguard_private_key";
+      };
+      wireguard_preshared_key = {
+        file = ../../secrets/wireguard_preshared_key.age;
+        owner = "root";
+        group = "root";
+        mode = "0400";
+        path = "/run/secrets/wireguard_preshared_key";
+      };
     };
   };
 
@@ -308,6 +348,203 @@
   # Or disable the firewall altogether.
   # networking.firewall.enable = false;
 
+  # =============================================================================
+  # SERVER HARDENING - Firewall, Fail2ban, SSH, Kernel
+  # =============================================================================
+  
+  # Firewall - default deny, explicit allow
+  networking.firewall = {
+    # Enable firewall with default deny policy (NixOS firewall denies all by default)
+    enable = true;
+    allowPing = true;
+    
+    # Only essential ports exposed to internet
+    allowedTCPPorts = [
+      2424  # SSH (non-standard port)
+      2222  # Gitea (version control)
+      80    # HTTP (Traefik redirect)
+      443   # HTTPS (Traefik)
+      # 8000  # Portainer - REVIEW: internal only?
+      # 4242  # Coms - REVIEW: internal only?
+      # 5000  # TAK API - REVIEW: internal only?
+      # 8087  # TAK Connect - REVIEW: internal only?
+      # 8089  # TAK Management - REVIEW: internal only?
+    ];
+    
+    allowedUDPPorts = [
+      51820 # WireGuard VPN
+    ];
+    
+    # Rate limiting and attack prevention
+    extraCommands = ''
+      # 1. Wipe the INPUT chain clean at the start of every activation
+      iptables -F INPUT
+      
+      # Rate limit SSH connections (max 20 new connections per 60 seconds)
+      iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 2424 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set
+      iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 2424 -m state --state NEW -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 20 -j DROP
+      
+      # Rate limit HTTP/HTTPS (protects Traefik)
+      iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 25/minute --limit-burst 100 -j ACCEPT
+      iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 25/minute --limit-burst 100 -j ACCEPT
+      
+      # Drop invalid packets
+      iptables -A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP
+      
+      # Log dropped packets (rate limited)
+      iptables -A INPUT -m limit --limit 5/min -j LOG --log-prefix "IPTables-Dropped: " --log-level 4
+
+      # 3. CRITICAL: Re-link the NixOS default firewall chain
+      # Without this line, the 'allowedTCPPorts' in your Nix config will be ignored!
+      iptables -A INPUT -j nixos-fw
+    '';
+  };
+
+  # Fail2ban - automatic IP banning
+  services.fail2ban = {
+    enable = true;
+    maxretry = 3;
+    bantime = "1h";
+    banaction = "iptables-multiport";
+    
+    jails = {
+      # SSH brute force protection (uses systemd journal backend)
+      sshd = {
+        enabled = true;
+        settings = {
+          filter = "sshd";
+          port = "2424";
+          maxretry = 3;
+          bantime = "1h";
+        };
+      };
+      
+      # Recidive - ban repeat offenders for 1 week
+      recidive = {
+        enabled = true;
+        settings = {
+          filter = "recidive";
+          logpath = "/var/log/fail2ban.log";
+          bantime = "1w";
+          findtime = "1d";
+          maxretry = 3;
+        };
+      };
+      
+      # HTTP authentication failures (Traefik)
+      http-auth = {
+        enabled = true;
+        settings = {
+          filter = "traefik-auth";
+          port = "80,443";
+          logpath = "/var/log/traefik/access.log";
+          maxretry = 5;
+          bantime = "1h";
+        };
+      };
+      
+      # HTTP scanning/attacks (Traefik)
+      http-botsearch = {
+        enabled = true;
+        settings = {
+          filter = "traefik-botsearch";
+          port = "80,443";
+          logpath = "/var/log/traefik/access.log";
+          maxretry = 2;
+          bantime = "2h";
+        };
+      };
+    };
+  };
+  
+  # Custom fail2ban filters for Traefik
+  environment.etc."fail2ban/filter.d/traefik-auth.conf".text = ''
+    [Definition]
+    failregex = ^<HOST> -.*"(GET|POST|HEAD|PUT|DELETE).*" (401|403) \d+.*$
+    ignoreregex =
+  '';
+  
+  environment.etc."fail2ban/filter.d/traefik-botsearch.conf".text = ''
+    [Definition]
+    failregex = ^<HOST> -.*"(GET|POST|HEAD|PUT|DELETE).*" 404 \d+.*$
+                ^<HOST> -.*"(GET|POST|HEAD|PUT|DELETE).*/(\.|wp-|php|admin|login|xmlrpc|\.env|\.git|\.aws|\.azure).*" \d+.*$
+    ignoreregex =
+  '';
+
+  # SSH hardening
+  services.openssh.settings = {
+    PermitRootLogin = "no";
+    MaxAuthTries = 3;
+    MaxSessions = 20;
+    LoginGraceTime = 30;
+    ClientAliveInterval = 300;
+    ClientAliveCountMax = 2;
+    PermitEmptyPasswords = "no";
+    ChallengeResponseAuthentication = "no";
+    UsePAM = true;
+    LogLevel = "VERBOSE";
+    X11Forwarding = false;
+    AllowTcpForwarding = "no";
+    AllowAgentForwarding = "no";
+    PermitTunnel = "no";
+  };
+
+  # Kernel network hardening
+  boot.kernel.sysctl = {
+    # IP Spoofing protection
+    "net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" = 1;
+    "net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" = 1;
+    
+    # Ignore ICMP broadcasts
+    "net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts" = 1;
+    
+    # Disable source routing
+    "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
+    "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route" = 0;
+    "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
+    "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route" = 0;
+    
+    # Disable redirects
+    "net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" = 0;
+    "net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" = 0;
+    
+    # SYN flood protection
+    "net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies" = 1;
+    "net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog" = 2048;
+    "net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries" = 2;
+    "net.ipv4.tcp_syn_retries" = 5;
+    
+    # Log martian packets
+    "net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians" = 1;
+    "net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians" = 1;
+    
+    # Ignore redirects
+    "net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
+    "net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
+    "net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" = 0;
+    "net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" = 0;
+    "net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
+    "net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
+    
+    # Connection tuning
+    "net.core.somaxconn" = 4096;
+    "net.core.netdev_max_backlog" = 65536;
+    "net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans" = 65536;
+    "net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout" = 15;
+    "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time" = 300;
+    "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes" = 5;
+    "net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl" = 15;
+  };
+
+  # Audit logging
+  security.auditd.enable = true;
+  
+  # Fail2ban log directory
+  systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
+    "d /var/log/fail2ban 0755 root root -"
+    "d /var/log/traefik 0755 root root -"
+  ];
+
   # Copy the NixOS configuration file and link it from the resulting system
   # (/run/current-system/configuration.nix). This is useful in case you
   # accidentally delete configuration.nix.

modules/nixos/security/README-ai-worker.md

@@ -1,64 +1,74 @@
 # AI Worker Restricted Access
 
-This module provides SSH access for the AI worker (hermes-agent) to run ollama benchmarks on the host.
+This module provides SSH access for the AI worker (hermes-agent) to run docker commands on the host with restrictions.
 
 ## Security Model
 
-The `ai-worker` user has:
+### Overview
+
+The `ai-worker` user is a member of the `docker` group, but the `docker` binary is wrapped with a script that **blocks dangerous subcommands** while allowing safe operations.
+
+### Blocked Commands
+
+These commands are intercepted by the docker wrapper and rejected:
+
+| Command | Risk | Reason |
+|---------|------|--------|
+| `docker exec` | Execute arbitrary commands inside running containers | FILE MODIFICATION |
+| `docker cp` | Copy files between containers and host | FILE ACCESS |
+| `docker commit` | Create images from running containers | DATA EXFIL |
+| `docker diff` | Inspect filesystem changes | INFO LEAK |
+| `docker export` | Export container filesystem as tar archive | DATA EXFIL |
+| `docker import` | Import a tar archive to create filesystem | FILE INJECTION |
+| `docker load` | Load images from tar archive | FILE INJECTION |
+| `docker save` | Save images to tar archive | DATA EXFIL |
+| `docker attach` | Attach to running container's stdio | INTERACTIVE ACCESS |
+| `docker push` | Push images to remote registries | DATA EXFIL |
+| `docker tag` | Tag/rename images | DATA EXFIL |
+
+Also blocked in compose context: `docker compose exec`, `docker compose cp`, etc.
+
+### Allowed Commands
+
+These commands work normally:
+
+- `docker ps` — list containers
+- `docker images` — list images
+- `docker inspect` — inspect containers/images
+- `docker logs` — view container logs
+- `docker start` — start a stopped container
+- `docker stop` — stop a running container
+- `docker restart` — restart a container
+- `docker rm` — remove a stopped container
+- `docker rmi` — remove an image
+- `docker pull` — pull an image
+- `docker build` — build an image
+- `docker run` — create and start a container
+- `docker compose` — compose orchestration (but not `compose exec`)
+- `docker system` — disk management
+- `docker network ls` — list networks
+- `docker volume ls` — list volumes
+
+### How It Works
+
+1. A wrapper script intercepts `docker` calls in the user's PATH
+2. It parses the first non-flag argument to determine the subcommand
+3. If the subcommand is in the blocklist, it prints an error and exits
+4. Otherwise, it passes through to the real Docker binary
+
+The wrapper is installed both as a system package and in ai-worker's personal profile to ensure it takes precedence over the real docker binary.
+
+### Why Not Use Docker Authorization Plugins?
+
+Docker's native authorization plugin system requires Docker-managed plugins (images) which is complex to deploy in NixOS. A CLI wrapper is simpler, maintainable, and effective for the primary threat model (an LLM agent that uses the docker CLI).
+
+Note: A determined attacker in the docker group can bypass the wrapper by calling the Docker API directly via `/var/run/docker.sock`. For the LLM agent threat model, this is a theoretical bypass — the agent uses CLI commands and `docker exec` returning an error is sufficient to stop it.
 
 ### Filesystem Access
 - **Home directory**: `/home/ai-worker` (standard user home)
 - **No bind mounts**: Cannot access `/home/gortium/infra` or other host files
 - **Cannot access**: Any files outside standard system paths
 
-### Sudo Access
-- **NONE**: ai-worker has no sudo privileges
-- Cannot run `nh`, `nixos-rebuild`, `nixpkgs-fmt`, or `nix` with elevated permissions
-
-### Docker Access
-- Member of `docker` group - can run `docker` and `docker exec` commands
-- Primary use: `docker exec ollama ollama ...` for benchmarking
-- Can run `docker exec --privileged ollama rocm-smi ...` for VRAM monitoring
-
-## Workflow: SSH + Docker Benchmarking
-
-The AI worker connects from the Hermes container to the host via SSH, runs ollama benchmarks, then returns to save results.
-
-### Example Workflow
-
-```bash
-# From Hermes container, SSH to host
-ssh -i /path/to/ssh/key ai-worker@host.docker.internal
-
-# On host, run ollama benchmarks via docker
-docker exec ollama ollama pull devstral-small-2:24b
-
-# Create test modelfile
-docker exec ollama bash -c 'cat <<EOF > /root/.ollama/test.modelfile
-FROM devstral-small-2:24b
-PARAMETER num_ctx 65536
-PARAMETER num_gpu 99
-PARAMETER flash_attn true
-EOF'
-
-# Create and test model
-docker exec ollama ollama create test-model -f /root/.ollama/test.modelfile
-docker exec ollama ollama run test-model "Write a Python async function"
-
-# Check VRAM usage
-docker exec --privileged ollama rocm-smi --showmeminfo vram
-
-# Cleanup
-docker exec ollama ollama rm test-model
-
-# Exit SSH, return to Hermes container
-exit
-
-# Save results in Hermes container
-# /opt/data/ai-optimizer/state.json
-# /opt/data/ai-optimizer/results.csv
-```
-
 ## SSH Access
 
 Connect as:
@@ -70,32 +80,42 @@ The working directory will be `/home/ai-worker`. No infra repo access.
 
 ## Verification
 
-Check ai-worker permissions:
 ```bash
-# On the host, as root or gortium:
-sudo -u ai-worker sudo -l
-# Should show: no sudo access
+# Verify wrapper is in PATH
+sudo -u ai-worker which docker
+# Should show: /home/ai-worker/.nix-profile/bin/docker (wrapped version)
 
-# Check docker group membership
+# Test blocked command (should fail)
+sudo -u ai-worker docker exec ollama ollama list
+# Expected: ERROR: docker 'exec' is blocked by security policy
+
+# Test allowed command (should work)
+sudo -u ai-worker docker ps
+# Expected: CONTAINER ID   IMAGE   ...
+
+# Verify docker group membership
 groups ai-worker
 # Should show: ai-worker docker
 ```
 
 ## Troubleshooting
 
-If ai-worker cannot run docker commands:
+If docker commands fail unexpectedly:
+
 ```bash
-# Check docker group membership
-groups ai-worker
+# Check which docker binary is being used
+which docker
+# If this shows /run/current-system/sw/bin/docker, the wrapper is not in PATH
 
-# Verify ollama container is running
-docker ps | grep ollama
+# Check if the wrapper is installed
+ls -la $(which docker)
 
-# Test docker access
-sudo -u ai-worker docker exec ollama ollama list
+# Verify you're running as the right user
+whoami
 ```
 
 If SSH connection fails:
+
 ```bash
 # Check SSH key is authorized
 cat /home/ai-worker/.ssh/authorized_keys

modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix

@@ -2,16 +2,123 @@
 
 with lib;
 
+let
+  # Docker subcommands that are BLOCKED for ai-worker
+  # These commands allow file modification inside containers or data exfiltration.
+  blockedCommands = [
+    "exec"    # Execute arbitrary commands in containers (FILE MODIFICATION)
+    "cp"      # Copy files between containers and host (FILE ACCESS)
+    "commit"  # Create images from running containers (DATA EXFIL)
+    "diff"    # Inspect filesystem changes of containers (INFO LEAK)
+    "export"  # Export container filesystem as tar archive (DATA EXFIL)
+    "import"  # Import a tar archive to create filesystem (FILE INJECTION)
+    "load"    # Load images from tar archive (FILE INJECTION)
+    "save"    # Save images to tar archive (DATA EXFIL)
+    "attach"  # Attach to running container's stdio (INTERACTIVE ACCESS)
+    "push"    # Push images to remote registries (DATA EXFIL)
+    "tag"     # Tag/rename images (used with push)
+  ];
+
+  blockedDockerArgs = lib.concatStringsSep "|" blockedCommands;
+
+  # Docker wrapper script that blocks dangerous subcommands
+  # Must handle: docker exec, docker compose exec, docker cp, etc.
+  restrictedDockerScript = pkgs.writeShellScriptBin "docker" ''
+    set -e
+
+    # Blocklist pattern
+    BLOCKED_PATTERN="^(${blockedDockerArgs})$"
+
+    # Parse the first non-flag argument to find the docker subcommand
+    # Flags: -H, --host, -D, --debug, --config, --context, --log-level, -l
+    # Also handle: docker compose <subcommand> (subcommand may be after 'compose')
+    SUBCOMMAND=""
+    COMPOSE_MODE=false
+    FOUND_ARG=false
+
+    for arg in "$@"; do
+      # Skip flags and their values
+      case "$arg" in
+        -H|--host|-l|--log-level|--config|--context|-D|--debug)
+          FOUND_ARG=true
+          continue
+          ;;
+        --tls|--tlsverify|--tlscacert|--tlscert|--tlskey)
+          if $FOUND_ARG; then FOUND_ARG=false; else continue; fi
+          ;;
+        # Skip flag values (the next arg after a flag that takes a value)
+        -*)
+          continue
+          ;;
+        *)
+          # This is a positional argument — first one is the subcommand (or 'compose')
+          if [ -z "$SUBCOMMAND" ]; then
+            if [ "$arg" = "compose" ]; then
+              COMPOSE_MODE=true
+              continue
+            fi
+            SUBCOMMAND="$arg"
+            break
+          fi
+          ;;
+      esac
+      FOUND_ARG=false
+    done
+
+    # If in compose mode, the subcommand is after 'compose'
+    if $COMPOSE_MODE; then
+      # In compose mode, we check the sub-subcommand
+      NEXT_GOT=""
+      for arg in "$@"; do
+        if [ "$NEXT_GOT" = "true" ]; then
+          if echo "$arg" | grep -qE "$BLOCKED_PATTERN"; then
+            echo "ERROR: docker compose '$arg' is blocked by security policy" >&2
+            echo "This command can modify files inside containers." >&2
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          break
+        fi
+        if [ "$arg" = "compose" ]; then
+          NEXT_GOT="true"
+        fi
+      done
+    fi
+
+    # Check if the subcommand is blocked
+    if [ -n "$SUBCOMMAND" ]; then
+      if echo "$SUBCOMMAND" | grep -qE "$BLOCKED_PATTERN"; then
+        echo "ERROR: docker '$SUBCOMMAND' is blocked by security policy" >&2
+        echo "This command can modify files inside containers." >&2
+        echo "" >&2
+        echo "Allowed commands: ps, images, inspect, logs, start, stop, restart," >&2
+        echo "  rm, rmi, pull, build, run, compose, system, network ls, volume ls" >&2
+        exit 1
+      fi
+    fi
+
+    # Execute the real docker binary
+    exec ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker "$@"
+  '';
+in
 {
   options.services.aiWorkerAccess = mkOption {
     type = types.bool;
     default = false;
-    description = "Enable AI worker SSH access with docker group membership for ollama benchmarking";
+    description = "Enable AI worker SSH access with restricted docker commands";
   };
 
   config = mkIf config.services.aiWorkerAccess {
-    # ai-worker is member of docker group - can run docker commands via SSH
-    # No bind mounts, no sudo access - docker-only for ollama benchmarking
+    # ai-worker is in docker group for normal docker operations
     users.groups.docker.members = [ "ai-worker" ];
+
+    # Install the docker wrapper for ai-worker
+    # This puts a filtered 'docker' script in ai-worker's PATH that blocks
+    # dangerous commands like exec, cp, commit, etc.
+    # The real docker binary is still available at its store path, but the
+    # wrapper intercepts it because ~/.nix-profile/bin/ comes before /run/.../sw/bin/ in PATH.
+    users.users.ai-worker.packages = [ restrictedDockerScript ];
+
+    # Also install the wrapper system-wide for consistency
+    environment.systemPackages = [ restrictedDockerScript ];
   };
 }

modules/nixos/services/ollama_init_custom_models.nix

@@ -1,45 +1,87 @@
 { pkgs, ... }: {
   systemd.services.init-ollama-model = {
     description = "Initialize LLM models with extra context in Ollama Docker";
-    after = [ "docker-ollama.service" ];
+    
+    # On s'assure que Docker tourne avant de lancer ce script
+    after = [ "docker.service" ];
     wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
+    
     script = ''
-      # Wait for Ollama
-      while ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s http://localhost:11434/api/tags > /dev/null; do
-        sleep 2
-      done
+      # Fonction de création asynchrone pour ne pas bloquer le démarrage
+      (
+        echo "Starting asynchronous Ollama initialization..."
+        
+        # Attente d'Ollama (maximum 120 secondes pour éviter une boucle infinie)
+        TIMEOUT=60
+        COUNT=0
+        while ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s -f http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/tags > /dev/null; do
+          if [ $COUNT -ge $TIMEOUT ]; then
+            echo "Ollama did not become ready in time. Exiting."
+            exit 1
+          fi
+          echo "Waiting for Ollama API to be reachable..."
+          sleep 5
+          COUNT=$((COUNT + 5))
+        done
 
-      create_model_if_missing() {
-        local model_name=$1
-        local base_model=$2
-        if ! ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama list | grep -q "$model_name"; then
-          echo "$model_name not found, creating from $base_model..."
-          ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama sh -c "cat <<EOF > /root/.ollama/$model_name.modelfile
+        create_model_if_missing() {
+          local model_name=$1
+          local base_model=$2
+          
+          # Vérification robuste via l'API HTTP d'Ollama plutôt que docker exec (évite les conflits de tty)
+          if ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/tags | ${pkgs.jq}/bin/jq -e ".models[] | select(.name == \"$model_name\")" > /dev/null; then
+            echo "$model_name not found, creating from $base_model..."
+            
+            # Utilisation d'un fichier temporaire sur l'hôte pour l'injecter proprement dans Docker
+            TMP_FILE=$(mktemp)
+            cat <<EOF > "$TMP_FILE"
 FROM $base_model
+TEMPLATE """{{- if .System }}
+[SYSTEM_PROMPT]
+{{ .System }}
+[/SYSTEM_PROMPT]
+{{- end }}
+{{- range .Messages }}
+{{- if eq .Role "user" }}
+[INST]
+{{ .Content }}
+[/INST]
+{{- else if eq .Role "assistant" }}
+{{ .Content }}
+{{- end }}
+{{- end }}"""
 PARAMETER num_ctx 131072
 PARAMETER num_predict 4096
 PARAMETER num_keep 1024
 PARAMETER repeat_penalty 1.1
 PARAMETER top_k 40
-PARAMETER stop \"[INST]\"
-PARAMETER stop \"[/INST]\"
-PARAMETER stop \"</s>\"
-EOF"
-          ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama create "$model_name" -f "/root/.ollama/$model_name.modelfile"
-        else
-          echo "$model_name already exists, skipping."
-        fi
-      }
+PARAMETER stop "[INST]"
+PARAMETER stop "[/INST]"
+PARAMETER stop "</s>"
+EOF
 
-      # Create Nemotron
-      create_model_if_missing "nemotron-3-nano:30b-128k" "nemotron-3-nano:30b"
-      
-      # Create Devstral
-      create_model_if_missing "devstral-small-2:24b-128k" "devstral-small-2:24b" 
+            # Copie et création dans le conteneur
+            ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker cp "$TMP_FILE" ollama:/tmp/model.modelfile
+            ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama create "$model_name" -f /tmp/model.modelfile
+            ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama rm /tmp/model.modelfile
+            rm -f "$TMP_FILE"
+          else
+            echo "$model_name already exists, skipping."
+          fi
+        }
+
+        # Create Nemotron
+        create_model_if_missing "nemotron-3-nano:30b-128k" "nemotron-3-nano:30b"
+        
+        # Create Devstral
+        create_model_if_missing "devstral-small-2:24b-128k" "devstral-small-2:24b" 
+        
+      ) &
     '';
+
     serviceConfig = {
-      Type = "oneshot";
-      RemainAfterExit = true;
+      Type = "forking"; # Permet à systemd de savoir que le script passe en arrière-plan via '&'
+      User = "root";
     };
   };
 }

secrets/containers.env.age

@@ -1,34 +1,36 @@
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secrets/wireguard_preshared_key.age

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
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+-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----

secrets/wireguard_private_key.age

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-----BEGIN AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----
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+-----END AGE ENCRYPTED FILE-----

users/ai-worker.nix

@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
     group = "ai-worker";
     home = "/home/ai-worker";
     createHome = true;
+    # ai-worker stays in docker group for normal docker operations (ps, start, stop, compose, ...)
+    # Dangerous commands (exec, cp, commit) are blocked by a wrapper script.
     extraGroups = [ "docker" ];
     shell = pkgs.bashInteractive;
     openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = [
@@ -14,12 +16,68 @@
   };
   users.groups.ai-worker = {};
 
-  # Enable restricted AI worker SSH access for ollama benchmarking
-  # SECURITY: ai-worker can only:
-  #   - SSH into host from Hermes container
-  #   - Run docker commands (docker exec ollama ...) via docker group
-  #   - NO access to infra repo (no bind mount)
-  #   - NO sudo access (no nh, nixos-rebuild, nixpkgs-fmt, nix)
-  # WORKFLOW: SSH from Hermes container, run docker benchmarks, return and save results to /opt/data/ai-optimizer/
+  # Enable restricted AI worker SSH access
+  # SECURITY: ai-worker is in docker group but docker commands are filtered:
+  #   ALLOWED: ps, images, logs, start, stop, restart, rm, rmi, pull, build, run, compose
+  #   BLOCKED: exec, cp, commit, diff, export, import, load, save, attach, push
+  # The filtering is done by a docker wrapper in ai-worker's PATH.
   services.aiWorkerAccess = true;
+
+  # Restricted sudo for ai-worker - security checks only (not for docker)
+  security.sudo.extraRules = [
+    {
+      users = [ "ai-worker" ];
+      commands = [
+        # Firewall checks
+        {
+          command = "/run/wrappers/bin/sudo iptables -L -n -v";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        {
+          command = "/run/wrappers/bin/sudo iptables -S";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        # Fail2ban status
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/fail2ban-client status";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/fail2ban-client status *";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/fail2ban-client get * banned";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        # Log inspection
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl -t kernel -n 100";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl -u fail2ban -n 50";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl -u firewall -n 50";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        # SSH config verification
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/sshd -T";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        # Network diagnostics
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/ss -tlnp";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+        {
+          command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/cat /proc/net/tcp";
+          options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
+        }
+      ];
+    }
+  ];
 }