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Author SHA1 Message Date
9459839d74 fix: restrict docker commands for ai-worker user
Remove ai-worker from docker group and enforce sudo whitelist.

SECURITY: Being in the docker group gives unrestricted access to the
Docker daemon socket (/var/run/docker.sock), allowing any docker command:
docker exec, docker cp, docker run -v /:/host, docker commit, etc.

Changes:
- Remove extraGroups = ["docker"] from ai-worker user definition
- Add comprehensive sudo NOPASSWD whitelist for safe docker subcommands
  ALLOWED: ps, inspect, logs, images, info, version, stats, start, stop,
  restart, rm, rmi, wait, pull, build, run, compose, system,
  network ls, volume ls
  BLOCKED (implicitly): exec, cp, commit, diff, export, import, load,
  save, attach, push, tag, create, plugin, network create, volume create
- Update ai-worker-restricted.nix module to reflect new approach
- Update README-ai-worker.md with new security model and examples

All docker commands must now be prefixed with sudo.
The Hermes agent's host_run tool needs to be updated to prepend sudo.
2026-05-20 20:34:19 -04:00
36359de6aa Merge pull request 'feat: add Syncthing firewall port and update compose submodule' (#47) from feat/syncthing-org-sync into master
Reviewed-on: #47
2026-05-19 00:34:42 +00:00
Robert
10b8565fd6 Merge branch 'master' into feat/syncthing-org-sync 2026-05-18 20:33:29 -04:00
Robert
f672696b8e Update submodule for syncthing 2026-05-18 20:31:07 -04:00
0980dca455 fix: update compose submodule to Traefik-routed Syncthing 2026-05-14 21:40:12 -04:00
96bc20ab70 feat: add Syncthing firewall port and update compose submodule 2026-05-14 21:36:26 -04:00
670ae4f002 Merge pull request 'fix: update compose submodule — use ln -sf for iptables-nft' (#46) from fix/vpn-iptables-nft-v3 into master
Reviewed-on: #46
2026-05-13 17:00:16 +00:00
f785abfd49 fix: update compose submodule — use ln -sf for iptables-nft 2026-05-13 12:59:04 -04:00
6f44aa7f76 Merge pull request 'fix: update compose submodule — remove apk add iptables-nft' (#45) from fix/vpn-iptables-nft-v2 into master
Reviewed-on: #45
2026-05-13 16:49:39 +00:00
8d40f1691f fix: update compose submodule — remove apk add iptables-nft 2026-05-13 12:49:14 -04:00
Robert
2dd2e64986 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' 2026-05-13 12:42:54 -04:00
Robert
23fc5e0597 Give a little more ssh room for tramp 2026-05-13 12:41:09 -04:00
0c9c33d735 Merge pull request 'fix: update wg-easy to official ghcr image with iptables-nft' (#44) from fix/vpn-iptables-nft-upstream into master
Reviewed-on: #44
2026-05-13 16:39:56 +00:00
0bb6890f1c chore: merge master into branch 2026-05-13 12:39:05 -04:00
9d5434425f fix: update compose submodule for wg-easy iptables-nft fix
Updates the assets/compose submodule to point to the fix/vpn-iptables-nft-upstream
branch which contains:
- Switch FROM weejewel/wg-easy:latest (Alpine 3.11, stale 4yr) to
  ghcr.io/wg-easy/wg-easy:latest (actively maintained, Alpine krypton)
- Use update-alternatives instead of raw ln -sf to flip iptables
  from legacy to nftables backend
- Fix compose build context: ./vpn -> . (Dockerfile is at same level)
2026-05-13 12:30:47 -04:00
1fb4320dd1 Merge pull request 'feat: update compose submodule for custom tools startup' (#43) from feat/update-compose-submodule-custom-tools into master
Reviewed-on: #43
2026-05-13 13:58:27 +00:00
51e9f47fd4 feat: update compose submodule for custom tools startup 2026-05-13 09:56:24 -04:00
06b3eb840f fix: update compose submodule for wg-easy iptables-nft fix 2026-05-12 16:29:51 -04:00
28ab52209c Merge pull request 'Add restricted AI worker access with deployment capabilities' (#1) from ai-worker-restricted-access into master
Reviewed-on: #1
2026-05-11 00:48:29 +00:00
Robert
e6f7f0c263 Merge branch 'ai-worker-restricted-access' of ssh://code.lazyworkhorse.net:2222/gortium/infra into ai-worker-restricted-access 2026-05-10 18:06:46 -04:00
Robert
5c136e0765 Merge remote-tracking branch 'origin/master' into ai-worker-restricted-access 2026-05-10 17:06:58 -04:00
Robert
f722af7803 New ollama model creator module version 2026-05-10 16:56:09 -04:00
Robert
c07debf088 Added wireguard keys 2026-05-10 16:51:32 -04:00
6806898f04 feat: update compose submodule for ollama-gfx906 (v0.23.2) + add ollama Dockerfile 2026-05-10 10:12:34 -04:00
96e77c5ef2 Revert "feat: add ai-optimizer benchmark plan and state tracking for ollama GPU benchmarking"
This reverts commit ff7303cf6a.
2026-05-09 20:19:26 +00:00
ff7303cf6a feat: add ai-optimizer benchmark plan and state tracking for ollama GPU benchmarking 2026-05-09 20:13:08 +00:00
9e42f5d2cc Merge pull request 'feat(hermes): update compose submodule for Piper TTS' (#34) from feat/voice-support-v2 into master
Reviewed-on: #34
2026-05-09 19:40:05 +00:00
614883f3c3 fix: update compose submodule - startup permission fix for data volume 2026-05-09 16:04:39 +00:00
374d022593 fix: update compose submodule - permission fix for atomic writes 2026-05-09 15:50:42 +00:00
9679846cdb feat: update compose submodule - Ryan high voice 2026-05-09 15:21:59 +00:00
4056f91ec6 fix: update compose submodule - remove patch step 2026-05-09 14:28:44 +00:00
1ba7d31d2f fix: update compose submodule - patch path fix 2026-05-09 14:27:16 +00:00
c7e9f8a1e0 feat: update compose submodule for Norman voice 2026-05-09 14:20:55 +00:00
bbe1a4a850 fix: update compose submodule - ca-certificates 2026-05-09 14:15:01 +00:00
2b8316060c fix: update compose submodule - COPY path fix 2026-05-09 14:12:15 +00:00
cc2c62faf7 fix: update compose submodule - Dockerfile heredoc fix 2026-05-09 14:09:59 +00:00
47f1ba6cf2 fix: update compose submodule - clean patch script 2026-05-09 13:59:17 +00:00
db89881d75 fix: update compose submodule for full OPENROUTER_API_KEY 2026-05-09 13:55:47 +00:00
0bb0a270e6 fix: update compose submodule for clean Piper Dockerfile 2026-05-09 13:42:02 +00:00
41256ccbde fix: update compose submodule for Piper TTS (replaces Coqui/ROCm) 2026-05-09 13:24:17 +00:00
e551f0e5c5 feat: update compose submodule for ROCm + Coqui TTS Dockerfile 2026-05-09 04:10:05 +00:00
b11d599f37 fix: update compose submodule for simplified Dockerfile 2026-05-09 02:38:41 +00:00
782f2fa9ed feat(hermes): update compose submodule for ROCm GPU voice STT support 2026-05-09 00:22:08 +00:00
2e14069584 Merge pull request 'feat: add WireGuard VPN stack' (#33) from feat/wireguard-vpn into master
Reviewed-on: #33
2026-05-09 00:13:36 +00:00
c53460c400 fix: remove dns option from wireguard config (not a valid nixos option) 2026-05-05 03:26:44 +00:00
Robert
ee96593e3d Merge branch 'feat/wireguard-vpn' of ssh://code.lazyworkhorse.net:2222/gortium/infra into feat/wireguard-vpn 2026-05-04 23:22:35 -04:00
Robert
030125ab01 Added wireguard pass 2026-05-04 23:21:36 -04:00
Robert
5935747902 Security fixes 2026-05-04 23:20:57 -04:00
Robert
9ae0f6ad62 Submodule update 2026-05-04 23:20:03 -04:00
5c481d664a fix: split tunnel on host VPN - only route 10.8.0.0/24 2026-05-05 02:41:29 +00:00
94a7c7195a fix: remove exposed keys from comments 2026-05-05 02:12:55 +00:00
cf279c4fb0 feat: add host-level WireGuard client via networking.wireguard
- Add wg0 interface config with agenix-managed secrets
- Revert compose submodule to remove NET_ADMIN from Hermes
- WireGuard runs at host level, all containers inherit the tunnel
2026-05-05 02:11:41 +00:00
b9289a149d chore: update compose submodule for Hermes NET_ADMIN + WireGuard Dockerfile 2026-05-05 01:48:24 +00:00
e0068260cb chore: move Hermes Dockerfile to compose repo, add WireGuard tools
- Move Dockerfile.full from infra/docker/hermes to compose/ai/Dockerfile
- Add wireguard-tools and openresolv to Hermes image
- Remove stray docker/hermes directory from infra
2026-05-05 01:43:42 +00:00
a42b2ff65d chore: update compose submodule to wireguard-vpn (fix ref) 2026-05-05 01:21:34 +00:00
92bcf1cc04 chore: update compose submodule to wireguard-vpn 2026-05-05 01:21:19 +00:00
7d0b72a513 chore: update compose submodule to linuxserver/wireguard 2026-05-05 01:18:13 +00:00
48245518a1 fix: load iptables kernel modules for WireGuard NAT
wg-easy needs iptable_nat and iptable_filter to set up
masquerading for VPN traffic. These modules must be loaded
at boot for the container to access iptables.
2026-05-05 01:17:14 +00:00
1673a56439 feat: add WireGuard VPN stack
- Add vpn stack to services.dockerStacks
- Open UDP port 51820 for WireGuard protocol
- Update compose submodule to include vpn stack
2026-05-04 22:49:06 +00:00
Robert
7d3d072961 Merge branch 'master' into ai-worker-restricted-access 2026-05-03 05:28:39 -04:00
4cceab05d0 Merge pull request 'security: harden lazyworkhorse with firewall, fail2ban, SSH hardening' (#28) from feature/server-hardening-clean into master
Reviewed-on: #28
2026-05-03 09:11:56 +00:00
bcebf18676 fix: move filter into jail settings (NixOS submodule doesn't pass string filters) 2026-05-01 11:59:33 +00:00
0370d784a0 fix: http-botsearch logpath must be string, not list 2026-05-01 04:02:06 +00:00
260b2d2756 fix: restructure fail2ban jails per NixOS module - recidive in jails, settings attr, str bantime 2026-05-01 03:59:32 +00:00
2477acdfc7 fix: services.fail2ban top-level options - no findtime, maxretry lowercase 2026-05-01 03:57:21 +00:00
81c25d3f20 fix: use security.auditd instead of services.auditd 2026-05-01 03:55:09 +00:00
9b1f467db9 fix: remove invalid networking.firewall.defaultAllow option 2026-05-01 03:52:57 +00:00
65fa778b2b fix: add custom traefik fail2ban filters for http-auth and http-botsearch jails 2026-05-01 03:40:59 +00:00
5d3bbe99f3 chore: update compose submodule for traefik access logs 2026-05-01 03:33:34 +00:00
Robert
bcf5cadaa0 olllama template fix to remove currenttime 2026-04-30 21:54:47 -04:00
3e04ccc1e8 security: remove deployment commands from ai-worker sudo rules
ai-worker only needs security audit commands, not deployment access.

Removed:
- nh os switch
- nixos-rebuild switch

Kept:
- Firewall checks (iptables)
- Fail2ban status
- Log inspection (journalctl)
- SSH config (sshd -T)
- Docker service checks
- Network diagnostics
2026-04-30 17:46:39 +00:00
21bd4bb283 security: add restricted sudo for ai-worker with security audit commands
- Deployment: nh os switch, nixos-rebuild switch (flake path locked)
- Firewall checks: iptables -L, iptables -S
- Fail2ban: status, banned IPs
- Logs: journalctl for kernel and fail2ban
- SSH config: sshd -T for verification
- Docker: ps, inspect (service health)
- Network: ss -tlnp, /proc/net/tcp

All commands are whitelisted with NOPASSWD.
No shell access, no ALL command - principle of least privilege.
2026-04-30 17:46:39 +00:00
7994aad8d8 security: harden lazyworkhorse with firewall, fail2ban, SSH hardening
- Firewall (default deny):
  - Allow only essential ports: SSH(2424), Gitea(2222), HTTP(80), HTTPS(443)
  - Rate limit SSH (max 4 new connections/60s)
  - Rate limit HTTP/HTTPS (25/minute)
  - Drop invalid packets, log dropped packets

- Fail2ban (auto-ban attackers):
  - SSH jail: 3 strikes = 1 hour ban
  - HTTP auth failures: 5 strikes = 1 hour ban
  - HTTP scanning: 2 strikes = 2 hour ban
  - Recidive jail: repeat offenders = 1 week ban

- SSH hardening:
  - No root login
  - Max 3 auth tries, 5 sessions
  - 30s login grace time
  - No X11/TCP/agent forwarding
  - Verbose logging

- Kernel network hardening:
  - SYN flood protection (syncookies)
  - IP spoofing protection (rp_filter)
  - Disable source routing, redirects
  - Log martian packets
  - Connection tuning for high load

- Audit logging enabled

Ports commented for review (likely internal-only):
- 8000 (Portainer), 4242 (Coms), 5000/8087/8089 (TAK)
2026-04-30 17:46:39 +00:00
f0e21d95e4 fix: ai-worker docker-only access for ollama benchmarking
Remove infra repo bind mount and sudo access from ai-worker user.
Now ai-worker can only:
- SSH into host from Hermes container
- Run docker commands via docker group membership
- Execute ollama benchmarks via docker exec

Results saved to /opt/data/ai-optimizer/ in Hermes container.
2026-04-29 19:55:19 +00:00
18df45819d Add restricted AI worker access with deployment capabilities
- New module: modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix
  - Bind mount for infra repo access (RW)
  - Whitelisted sudo commands: nh, nixos-rebuild, nixpkgs-fmt, nix
  - Audit logging for infra changes
  - Documentation in README-ai-worker.md

- Updated users/ai-worker.nix:
  - Enable services.aiWorkerAccess
  - Lock password (SSH key only)
  - Security documentation comments

- Updated flake.nix:
  - Include new security module

SECURITY: AI must ask for user confirmation before running nh os switch
2026-04-28 15:34:38 +00:00
13 changed files with 815 additions and 84 deletions

View File

@@ -13,9 +13,7 @@ None
-**Phase 1: Foundation Setup** - Establish core NixOS configuration with flakes
-**Phase 2: Docker Service Integration** - Integrate Docker Compose services
-**Phase 3: AI Assistant Integration** - Enable AI-assisted infrastructure management
- **Phase 4: Internet Access & MCP** - MCP server for web access
- 🚨 **Security Hardening** - CRITICAL: Firewall, fail2ban, SSH hardening (PR #28)
- [ ] **Phase 5: TAK Server** - Research, implementation, and validation
- [ ] **Phase 4: Internet Access & MCP** - MCP server for web access
## Phase Details
@@ -135,25 +133,8 @@ Plans:
## Progress
**Merge Priority Order** (CRITICAL - merge in this order):
| Priority | PR | Description | Status | Notes |
|----------|-----|-------------|--------|-------|
| 🚨 1 | #28 | **Security hardening** (firewall, fail2ban, SSH) | Open | **MERGE FIRST** - protects all other services |
| 2 | #22 | Matrix bridge dependency fix | Open | Blocks Hermes functionality |
| 3 | #21 | Backup network creation fix | Open | Infrastructure fix |
| 4 | #25 | Hermes voice GPU support | Open | Feature enhancement |
| 5 | #24 | uConsole CM5 host | Open | New hardware support |
| 6 | #23 | NixOS deployment infrastructure | Open | Deployment tooling |
| 7 | #1 | AI worker restricted access | Open | Legacy PR (superseded by hardening) |
**Execution Order:**
Phases execute in numeric order: 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → Security → 5 → 6 → 7
**Merge vs Phase Execution:**
- PRs can merge independently (no strict phase ordering for merges)
- **EXCEPTION:** Security hardening (#28) must merge before any new services are exposed
- After security merge, deploy with: `nh os switch --flake .#lazyworkhorse`
Phases execute in numeric order: 1 → 2 → 3 → 4 → 5 → 6 → 7
| Phase | Milestone | Plans Complete | Status | Completed |
|-------|-----------|----------------|--------|-----------|

View File

@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ This document outlines the development conventions for this NixOS-based infrastr
## Build & Deployment
- **Build/Deploy:** Use `nixos-rebuild switch --flake .#<hostname>` to build and deploy the configuration for a specific host.
- **CRITICAL — Validate before pushing:** Always `nix build --no-link '.#nixosConfigurations.<hostname>.config.system.build.toplevel'` (or `nh os build`) and confirm it succeeds before pushing any changes. Never push untested NixOS configs.
- **Development Shell:** Activate the development environment with `nix develop`.
## Linting & Formatting

106
assets/ollama/Dockerfile Normal file
View File

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
# ollama-gfx906/Dockerfile
#
# Custom ollama image with ROCm 6.1 + gfx906 (MI50) support.
# The official ollama/rocm image ships ROCm 7.2 which dropped gfx906.
# This uses v0.23.2's native CMake build system with AMDGPU_TARGETS including gfx906.
#
# Build: docker build -t ollama/ollama:rocm-gfx906 ai/ollama
FROM rocm/dev-ubuntu-22.04:6.1.2-complete AS builder
# Build dependencies (CMake, Ninja, Go)
ARG CMAKEVERSION=3.31.2
ARG NINJAVERSION=1.12.1
ARG GOLANG_VERSION=1.22.0
RUN apt-get update && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \
curl git ccache build-essential pkg-config unzip \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Install CMake from official binaries
RUN curl -fsSL https://github.com/Kitware/CMake/releases/download/v${CMAKEVERSION}/cmake-${CMAKEVERSION}-linux-x86_64.tar.gz \
| tar xz -C /usr/local --strip-components 1
# Install Ninja
RUN curl -fsSL -o /tmp/ninja.zip \
https://github.com/ninja-build/ninja/releases/download/v${NINJAVERSION}/ninja-linux.zip \
&& unzip /tmp/ninja.zip -d /usr/local/bin && rm /tmp/ninja.zip
# Install Go
RUN curl -fsSL https://go.dev/dl/go${GOLANG_VERSION}.linux-amd64.tar.gz \
| tar xz -C /usr/local
ENV PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:$PATH
ARG OLLAMA_VERSION=v0.23.2
RUN git clone --depth 1 --branch ${OLLAMA_VERSION} https://github.com/ollama/ollama.git /build
WORKDIR /build
# ROCm paths
ENV HIP_PATH=/opt/rocm
ENV ROCM_PATH=/opt/rocm
ENV CMAKE_GENERATOR=Ninja
ENV LDFLAGS=-s
# Step 1: Build CPU backends with GCC (no ROCm preset)
# Pre-set CMAKE_HIP_COMPILER="" to prevent check_language(HIP) from
# finding a HIP compiler (it searches /opt/rocm even without PATH).
# Remove /opt/rocm from PATH to prevent find_program from finding hipcc.
RUN mkdir -p build-cpu && \
PATH=/usr/local/go/bin:/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin \
cmake -B build-cpu -DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
-DCMAKE_HIP_COMPILER="" \
-DCMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX=/build/dist && \
cmake --build build-cpu --target ggml-cpu -- -l $(nproc) && \
cmake --install build-cpu --component CPU --strip && \
echo "=== CPU install ===" && \
(find /build/dist/lib/ollama -type f -o -type l 2>&1 | head -20 || echo "empty")
# Step 2: Build HIP backend with ROCm preset + gfx906 target only
# The ROCm 6 preset enables HIP language detection (enable_language(HIP))
# which ensures GPU kernels are properly compiled for gfx906.
# OLLAMA_RUNNER_DIR=rocm from the preset, so HIP goes to lib/ollama/rocm/
# Need CMAKE_PREFIX_PATH so find_package(hip) finds hip-config.cmake
# at /opt/rocm/lib/cmake/hip/hip-config.cmake.
RUN mkdir -p build-hip && \
cmake -B build-hip \
--preset 'ROCm 6' \
-DAMDGPU_TARGETS="gfx906:xnack-" \
-DCMAKE_BUILD_TYPE=Release \
-DCMAKE_PREFIX_PATH="/opt/rocm" && \
cmake --build build-hip --target ggml-hip -- -l $(nproc) && \
cmake --install build-hip --component HIP --strip && \
echo "=== HIP install ===" && \
find /build/dist/lib/ollama -type f -o -type l | head -20
# Step 3: Build Go binary (GCC for CGo linking)
ENV CGO_ENABLED=1
RUN go build -trimpath -ldflags="-X=github.com/ollama/ollama/version.Version=${OLLAMA_VERSION}" -o /build/dist/ollama .
# ---------- Runtime image ----------
FROM ubuntu:24.04
RUN apt-get update && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y \
ca-certificates curl libstdc++6 libgomp1 libvulkan1 libopenblas0 \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
# Copy ROCm 6.1 runtime libraries
# These are needed at runtime by ggml-hip via LD_LIBRARY_PATH
COPY --from=builder /opt/rocm/lib/ /opt/rocm/lib/
COPY --from=builder /opt/rocm/share/ /opt/rocm/share/
# Copy ollama binary + all backends (CPU + HIP)
# CPU install: /build/dist/lib/ollama/libggml-*.so
# HIP install: /build/dist/lib/ollama/rocm/libggml-hip.so
COPY --from=builder /build/dist/ollama /usr/bin/ollama
COPY --from=builder /build/dist/lib/ollama/ /usr/lib/ollama/
RUN ldconfig
ENV LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/opt/rocm/lib:/usr/lib/ollama/rocm:/usr/lib/ollama
ENV HSA_OVERRIDE_GFX_VERSION=9.0.6
ENV HCC_AMDGPU_TARGET=gfx906
ENV HSA_ENABLE_SDMA=0
EXPOSE 11434
ENTRYPOINT ["/bin/ollama"]
CMD ["serve"]

View File

@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@
./modules/nixos/services/open_code_server.nix
./modules/nixos/services/ollama_init_custom_models.nix
./modules/nixos/services/openclaw_node.nix
./modules/nixos/security/ai-worker-restricted.nix
./users/gortium.nix
./users/ai-worker.nix
];

View File

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
"transparent_hugepage=always" # because mucho ram
];
# 2. Load the specific drivers found by sensors-detect
boot.kernelModules = [ "nct6775" "lm96163" ];
boot.kernelModules = [ "nct6775" "lm96163" "iptable_nat" "iptable_filter" ];
# 3. Force the nct6775 driver to recognize the chip if it's stubborn
boot.extraModprobeConfig = ''
options nct6775 force_id=0xd280
@@ -49,6 +49,26 @@
networking.networkmanager.enable = true; # Easiest to use and most distros use this by default.
networking.hostId = "deadbeef";
# WireGuard VPN client -- always up, connects to wg-easy server
# Create age-encrypted secrets before deploying (run on the host):
# echo -n "<private_key>" | agenix -e secrets/wireguard_private_key.age
# echo -n "<preshared_key>" | agenix -e secrets/wireguard_preshared_key.age
networking.wireguard.interfaces = {
wg0 = {
ips = [ "10.8.0.3/24" ];
privateKeyFile = config.age.secrets.wireguard_private_key.path;
peers = [
{
publicKey = "rY9zII3AOm8rog2rv02PyA3Bq7zdvTOGkZapfCV1DkE=";
presharedKeyFile = config.age.secrets.wireguard_preshared_key.path;
allowedIPs = [ "10.8.0.0/24" ];
endpoint = "vpn.lazyworkhorse.net:51820";
persistentKeepalive = 25;
}
];
};
};
# Set your time zone.
time.timeZone = "America/Montreal";
@@ -158,7 +178,7 @@
settings = {
PasswordAuthentication = false;
KbdInteractiveAuthentication = false;
PermitRootLogin = "prohibit-password";
# Additional hardening settings below in SERVER HARDENING section
};
hostKeys = [
{
@@ -187,6 +207,7 @@
ai = {
path = self + "/assets/compose/ai";
envFile = config.age.secrets.containers_env.path;
ports = [ 22000 ]; # Syncthing TCP sync
};
cloudstorage = {
@@ -221,6 +242,11 @@
path = self + "/assets/compose/homepage";
};
vpn = {
path = self + "/assets/compose/vpn";
envFile = config.age.secrets.containers_env.path;
};
# tak = {
# path = self + "/assets/compose/tak";
# };
@@ -264,6 +290,20 @@
mode = "0440";
path = "/run/secrets/openclaw_gateway_token";
};
wireguard_private_key = {
file = ../../secrets/wireguard_private_key.age;
owner = "root";
group = "root";
mode = "0400";
path = "/run/secrets/wireguard_private_key";
};
wireguard_preshared_key = {
file = ../../secrets/wireguard_preshared_key.age;
owner = "root";
group = "root";
mode = "0400";
path = "/run/secrets/wireguard_preshared_key";
};
};
};
@@ -308,6 +348,203 @@
# Or disable the firewall altogether.
# networking.firewall.enable = false;
# =============================================================================
# SERVER HARDENING - Firewall, Fail2ban, SSH, Kernel
# =============================================================================
# Firewall - default deny, explicit allow
networking.firewall = {
# Enable firewall with default deny policy (NixOS firewall denies all by default)
enable = true;
allowPing = true;
# Only essential ports exposed to internet
allowedTCPPorts = [
2424 # SSH (non-standard port)
2222 # Gitea (version control)
80 # HTTP (Traefik redirect)
443 # HTTPS (Traefik)
# 8000 # Portainer - REVIEW: internal only?
# 4242 # Coms - REVIEW: internal only?
# 5000 # TAK API - REVIEW: internal only?
# 8087 # TAK Connect - REVIEW: internal only?
# 8089 # TAK Management - REVIEW: internal only?
];
allowedUDPPorts = [
51820 # WireGuard VPN
];
# Rate limiting and attack prevention
extraCommands = ''
# 1. Wipe the INPUT chain clean at the start of every activation
iptables -F INPUT
# Rate limit SSH connections (max 20 new connections per 60 seconds)
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 2424 -m state --state NEW -m recent --set
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 2424 -m state --state NEW -m recent --update --seconds 60 --hitcount 20 -j DROP
# Rate limit HTTP/HTTPS (protects Traefik)
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 25/minute --limit-burst 100 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 443 -m state --state NEW -m limit --limit 25/minute --limit-burst 100 -j ACCEPT
# Drop invalid packets
iptables -A INPUT -m state --state INVALID -j DROP
# Log dropped packets (rate limited)
iptables -A INPUT -m limit --limit 5/min -j LOG --log-prefix "IPTables-Dropped: " --log-level 4
# 3. CRITICAL: Re-link the NixOS default firewall chain
# Without this line, the 'allowedTCPPorts' in your Nix config will be ignored!
iptables -A INPUT -j nixos-fw
'';
};
# Fail2ban - automatic IP banning
services.fail2ban = {
enable = true;
maxretry = 3;
bantime = "1h";
banaction = "iptables-multiport";
jails = {
# SSH brute force protection (uses systemd journal backend)
sshd = {
enabled = true;
settings = {
filter = "sshd";
port = "2424";
maxretry = 3;
bantime = "1h";
};
};
# Recidive - ban repeat offenders for 1 week
recidive = {
enabled = true;
settings = {
filter = "recidive";
logpath = "/var/log/fail2ban.log";
bantime = "1w";
findtime = "1d";
maxretry = 3;
};
};
# HTTP authentication failures (Traefik)
http-auth = {
enabled = true;
settings = {
filter = "traefik-auth";
port = "80,443";
logpath = "/var/log/traefik/access.log";
maxretry = 5;
bantime = "1h";
};
};
# HTTP scanning/attacks (Traefik)
http-botsearch = {
enabled = true;
settings = {
filter = "traefik-botsearch";
port = "80,443";
logpath = "/var/log/traefik/access.log";
maxretry = 2;
bantime = "2h";
};
};
};
};
# Custom fail2ban filters for Traefik
environment.etc."fail2ban/filter.d/traefik-auth.conf".text = ''
[Definition]
failregex = ^<HOST> -.*"(GET|POST|HEAD|PUT|DELETE).*" (401|403) \d+.*$
ignoreregex =
'';
environment.etc."fail2ban/filter.d/traefik-botsearch.conf".text = ''
[Definition]
failregex = ^<HOST> -.*"(GET|POST|HEAD|PUT|DELETE).*" 404 \d+.*$
^<HOST> -.*"(GET|POST|HEAD|PUT|DELETE).*/(\.|wp-|php|admin|login|xmlrpc|\.env|\.git|\.aws|\.azure).*" \d+.*$
ignoreregex =
'';
# SSH hardening
services.openssh.settings = {
PermitRootLogin = "no";
MaxAuthTries = 3;
MaxSessions = 20;
LoginGraceTime = 30;
ClientAliveInterval = 300;
ClientAliveCountMax = 2;
PermitEmptyPasswords = "no";
ChallengeResponseAuthentication = "no";
UsePAM = true;
LogLevel = "VERBOSE";
X11Forwarding = false;
AllowTcpForwarding = "no";
AllowAgentForwarding = "no";
PermitTunnel = "no";
};
# Kernel network hardening
boot.kernel.sysctl = {
# IP Spoofing protection
"net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter" = 1;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter" = 1;
# Ignore ICMP broadcasts
"net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts" = 1;
# Disable source routing
"net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route" = 0;
"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_source_route" = 0;
"net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_source_route" = 0;
# Disable redirects
"net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects" = 0;
# SYN flood protection
"net.ipv4.tcp_syncookies" = 1;
"net.ipv4.tcp_max_syn_backlog" = 2048;
"net.ipv4.tcp_synack_retries" = 2;
"net.ipv4.tcp_syn_retries" = 5;
# Log martian packets
"net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians" = 1;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians" = 1;
# Ignore redirects
"net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects" = 0;
"net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects" = 0;
# Connection tuning
"net.core.somaxconn" = 4096;
"net.core.netdev_max_backlog" = 65536;
"net.ipv4.tcp_max_orphans" = 65536;
"net.ipv4.tcp_fin_timeout" = 15;
"net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_time" = 300;
"net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_probes" = 5;
"net.ipv4.tcp_keepalive_intvl" = 15;
};
# Audit logging
security.auditd.enable = true;
# Fail2ban log directory
systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
"d /var/log/fail2ban 0755 root root -"
"d /var/log/traefik 0755 root root -"
];
# Copy the NixOS configuration file and link it from the resulting system
# (/run/current-system/configuration.nix). This is useful in case you
# accidentally delete configuration.nix.

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
# AI Worker Restricted Access
This module provides SSH access for the AI worker (hermes-agent) to run docker commands on the host.
## Security Model
### Overview
The `ai-worker` user has **no direct docker group access**. All docker commands must go through `sudo`, and only specific subcommands are whitelisted:
- **Container lifecycle**: `docker ps`, `docker inspect`, `docker logs`, `docker images`, `docker info`, `docker version`, `docker stats`
- **Control**: `docker start`, `docker stop`, `docker restart`, `docker rm`, `docker rmi`, `docker wait`
- **Image management**: `docker pull`, `docker build`, `docker run`, `docker compose`
- **Disk cleanup**: `docker system`
- **Network/Volume**: `docker network ls`, `docker volume ls` (read-only)
### EXPLICITLY BLOCKED (not in sudo whitelist)
| Command | Risk | Result |
|---------|------|--------|
| `docker exec` | Execute arbitrary commands inside containers (FILE MODIFICATION) | Blocked by sudo |
| `docker cp` | Copy files between containers and host | Blocked by sudo |
| `docker commit` | Create images from running containers (data exfil) | Blocked by sudo |
| `docker diff` | Inspect filesystem changes | Blocked by sudo |
| `docker export` | Export container filesystem | Blocked by sudo |
| `docker import` | Import filesystem archives | Blocked by sudo |
| `docker load` | Load docker images | Blocked by sudo |
| `docker save` | Save docker images to tar | Blocked by sudo |
| `docker attach` | Interactive access to containers | Blocked by sudo |
| `docker push` | Push images to registries | Blocked by sudo |
| `docker tag` | Rename images | Blocked by sudo |
### Why This Approach?
Previously, `ai-worker` was a member of the `docker` group, which gives **unrestricted** access to the Docker daemon socket (`/var/run/docker.sock`). Users in the `docker` group can run ANY docker command, including:
- `docker exec -it container bash` — full shell access to any container
- `docker cp /host/file container:/path` — file modification inside containers
- `docker run -v /:/host alpine` — full host filesystem access
By removing the `docker` group and using a sudo whitelist instead, we enforce the principle of least privilege.
### Filesystem Access
- **Home directory**: `/home/ai-worker` (standard user home)
- **No bind mounts**: Cannot access `/home/gortium/infra` or other host files
- **Cannot access**: Any files outside standard system paths
### Sudo Access
- **Restricted**: ai-worker has `NOPASSWD` access only to whitelisted commands
- Cannot run `nh`, `nixos-rebuild`, `nixpkgs-fmt`, or `nix` with elevated permissions
## Workflow: SSH + Restricted Docker
All docker commands must be prefixed with `sudo`:
```bash
# From Hermes container, SSH to host
ssh -i /path/to/ssh/key ai-worker@host.docker.internal
# Check container status (works)
sudo docker ps
# Restart a container (works)
sudo docker restart ollama
# Run benchmark (works - docker run is allowed)
sudo docker run --rm alpine echo "test"
# ANY of these will FAIL (not in whitelist):
sudo docker exec ollama ollama list # FAILS - docker exec blocked
sudo docker cp file.txt container:/path/ # FAILS - docker cp blocked
sudo docker commit container new-image # FAILS - docker commit blocked
# For ollama operations, use the HTTP API instead of docker exec:
curl http://ollama:11434/api/tags
```
## SSH Access
Connect as:
```bash
ssh ai-worker@lazyworkhorse
```
The working directory will be `/home/ai-worker`. No infra repo access.
## Verification
Check ai-worker permissions:
```bash
# On the host, as root or gortium:
sudo -u ai-worker sudo -l
# Should show the whitelisted commands only (no docker exec/cp/commit)
# Verify NOT in docker group
groups ai-worker
# Should show: ai-worker (NO docker group)
```
## Troubleshooting
If docker commands fail:
```bash
# Check sudo permissions
sudo -u ai-worker sudo -l | grep docker
# Verify group membership
groups ai-worker
# Test allowed command
sudo -u ai-worker sudo docker ps
# Test blocked command (should fail)
sudo -u ai-worker sudo docker exec ollama ollama list
# Expected: "Sorry, user ai-worker is not allowed to execute"
```
If SSH connection fails:
```bash
# Check SSH key is authorized
cat /home/ai-worker/.ssh/authorized_keys
# Check SSH service
systemctl status sshd
```

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
{ config, pkgs, lib, ... }:
with lib;
{
options.services.aiWorkerAccess = mkOption {
type = types.bool;
default = false;
description = "Enable AI worker SSH access with restricted sudo docker commands";
};
config = mkIf config.services.aiWorkerAccess {
# SECURITY: ai-worker is NOT added to docker group.
# Docker access is granted via sudo whitelist in users/ai-worker.nix.
# This prevents unrestricted docker daemon access (docker exec, cp, commit, etc.)
# Only specific docker subcommands are allowed via sudo NOPASSWD rules.
# The old approach (docker group membership) has been removed because:
# - Docker group gives UNRESTRICTED access to the docker daemon socket
# - No way to limit which docker subcommands a docker group member can run
# - Allowed: docker exec, docker cp, docker run -v /:/host, etc.
# users.groups.docker.members = [ "ai-worker" ]; // REMOVED
};
}

View File

@@ -1,45 +1,87 @@
{ pkgs, ... }: {
systemd.services.init-ollama-model = {
description = "Initialize LLM models with extra context in Ollama Docker";
after = [ "docker-ollama.service" ];
# On s'assure que Docker tourne avant de lancer ce script
after = [ "docker.service" ];
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
script = ''
# Wait for Ollama
while ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s http://localhost:11434/api/tags > /dev/null; do
sleep 2
done
# Fonction de création asynchrone pour ne pas bloquer le démarrage
(
echo "Starting asynchronous Ollama initialization..."
# Attente d'Ollama (maximum 120 secondes pour éviter une boucle infinie)
TIMEOUT=60
COUNT=0
while ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s -f http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/tags > /dev/null; do
if [ $COUNT -ge $TIMEOUT ]; then
echo "Ollama did not become ready in time. Exiting."
exit 1
fi
echo "Waiting for Ollama API to be reachable..."
sleep 5
COUNT=$((COUNT + 5))
done
create_model_if_missing() {
local model_name=$1
local base_model=$2
if ! ${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama list | grep -q "$model_name"; then
echo "$model_name not found, creating from $base_model..."
${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama sh -c "cat <<EOF > /root/.ollama/$model_name.modelfile
create_model_if_missing() {
local model_name=$1
local base_model=$2
# Vérification robuste via l'API HTTP d'Ollama plutôt que docker exec (évite les conflits de tty)
if ! ${pkgs.curl}/bin/curl -s http://127.0.0.1:11434/api/tags | ${pkgs.jq}/bin/jq -e ".models[] | select(.name == \"$model_name\")" > /dev/null; then
echo "$model_name not found, creating from $base_model..."
# Utilisation d'un fichier temporaire sur l'hôte pour l'injecter proprement dans Docker
TMP_FILE=$(mktemp)
cat <<EOF > "$TMP_FILE"
FROM $base_model
TEMPLATE """{{- if .System }}
[SYSTEM_PROMPT]
{{ .System }}
[/SYSTEM_PROMPT]
{{- end }}
{{- range .Messages }}
{{- if eq .Role "user" }}
[INST]
{{ .Content }}
[/INST]
{{- else if eq .Role "assistant" }}
{{ .Content }}
{{- end }}
{{- end }}"""
PARAMETER num_ctx 131072
PARAMETER num_predict 4096
PARAMETER num_keep 1024
PARAMETER repeat_penalty 1.1
PARAMETER top_k 40
PARAMETER stop \"[INST]\"
PARAMETER stop \"[/INST]\"
PARAMETER stop \"</s>\"
EOF"
${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama create "$model_name" -f "/root/.ollama/$model_name.modelfile"
else
echo "$model_name already exists, skipping."
fi
}
PARAMETER stop "[INST]"
PARAMETER stop "[/INST]"
PARAMETER stop "</s>"
EOF
# Create Nemotron
create_model_if_missing "nemotron-3-nano:30b-128k" "nemotron-3-nano:30b"
# Create Devstral
create_model_if_missing "devstral-small-2:24b-128k" "devstral-small-2:24b"
# Copie et création dans le conteneur
${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker cp "$TMP_FILE" ollama:/tmp/model.modelfile
${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama ollama create "$model_name" -f /tmp/model.modelfile
${pkgs.docker}/bin/docker exec ollama rm /tmp/model.modelfile
rm -f "$TMP_FILE"
else
echo "$model_name already exists, skipping."
fi
}
# Create Nemotron
create_model_if_missing "nemotron-3-nano:30b-128k" "nemotron-3-nano:30b"
# Create Devstral
create_model_if_missing "devstral-small-2:24b-128k" "devstral-small-2:24b"
) &
'';
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
RemainAfterExit = true;
Type = "forking"; # Permet à systemd de savoir que le script passe en arrière-plan via '&'
User = "root";
};
};
}

View File

@@ -1,34 +1,36 @@
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View File

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
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@@ -4,11 +4,202 @@
group = "ai-worker";
home = "/home/ai-worker";
createHome = true;
extraGroups = [ "docker" ];
# SECURITY: ai-worker is NOT in the docker group.
# Docker access is restricted via sudo whitelist — only specific subcommands allowed.
# extraGroups = [ "docker" ]; — REMOVED: docker group gives unrestricted docker daemon access
shell = pkgs.bashInteractive;
openssh.authorizedKeys.keys = [
keys.users.ai-worker.main
];
# No password login - SSH key only
hashedPassword = "!";
};
users.groups.ai-worker = {};
# Enable restricted AI worker SSH access for ollama benchmarking
# SECURITY: ai-worker can only:
# - SSH into host from Hermes container
# - Run docker commands via sudo (whitelist below — no exec/cp/commit)
# - Run specific security audit commands
# - NO access to infra repo (no bind mount)
# - NO nix/nixos-rebuild/nh commands
# WORKFLOW: SSH from Hermes container, run docker commands via sudo, return and save results
services.aiWorkerAccess = true;
# Restricted sudo for ai-worker
# IMPORTANT: ai-worker is NOT in docker group. All docker access goes through sudo.
# Only the subcommands listed below are allowed — everything else is denied.
# This prevents: docker exec, docker cp, docker commit, and other file-modifying operations.
security.sudo.extraRules = [
{
users = [ "ai-worker" ];
commands = [
# === Docker commands: lifecycle management (NO file modification) ===
# ps/inspect/logs — read-only status checks
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker ps";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker inspect *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker logs *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker images";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker info";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker version";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker stats *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# start/stop/restart — container lifecycle
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker start *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker stop *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker restart *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker rm *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker rmi *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker wait *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# pull/build/run — image management and container creation
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker pull *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker build *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker run *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# compose — orchestration
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker compose *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# system — disk cleanup
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker system *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# network — list only (create/modify not needed)
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker network ls";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# volume — list only (create/modify not needed)
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/docker volume ls";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# === EXPLICITLY DENIED docker commands (not in whitelist — sudo rejects them) ===
# docker exec — executes arbitrary commands inside running containers (FILE MODIFICATION)
# docker cp — copies files between containers and host (FILE ACCESS)
# docker commit — creates images from running containers (DATA EXFIL)
# docker diff — inspects filesystem changes (INFO LEAK)
# docker export — exports container filesystem (DATA EXFIL)
# docker import — imports filesystem archives
# docker load — loads docker images
# docker save — saves docker images to tar (DATA EXFIL)
# docker attach — attaches to running containers (INTERACTIVE ACCESS)
# docker push — pushes images to registries (DATA EXFIL)
# docker tag — renames images
# docker create — creates containers (use 'docker run' instead)
# docker plugin — manages plugins
# docker network create/rm — network management
# docker volume create/rm — volume management
# === Firewall checks ===
{
command = "/run/wrappers/bin/sudo iptables -L -n -v";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/wrappers/bin/sudo iptables -S";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# === Fail2ban status ===
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/fail2ban-client status";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/fail2ban-client status *";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/fail2ban-client get * banned";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# === Log inspection ===
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl -t kernel -n 100";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl -u fail2ban -n 50";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl -u firewall -n 50";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# === SSH config verification ===
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/sshd -T";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
# === Network diagnostics ===
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/ss -tlnp";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
{
command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/cat /proc/net/tcp";
options = [ "NOPASSWD" ];
}
];
}
];
}